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ABSTRACT
In many Western states the fiscal impacts of energy development on local
governments have become cause for concern at the state level. States may wish
to intervene to improve the efficiency of capital markets, to provide compen-
sation to those who suffer from adverse impacts, or to ensure the orderly
development of the natural resources of the state. Drawing on the experience
of Wyoming as well as other states, the thesis develops a set of alternative
strategies for raising and distributing state aid to impacted communities.
Each alternative is evaluated in terms of the distribution of the advantages
and disadvantages likely to be experienced by groups which are supportive or
opposed to the use of the option. Wyoming's experience in implementing
certain of these strategies is discussed. Finally, a preferential ordering
of the alternative strategies as means for achieving the goals of capital
market efficiency, fair compensation and orderly development is presented.
Name and Title of Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence Susskind, Associate Professor
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INTRODUCTION
As our nation develops its energy resources, government at all levels
will come under increasing pressure to balance the often conflicting demands
for cheap energy, environmental quality, economic development, and minimum
disruption of lifestyles. The two years of deadlock between Congress and
President Ford is an indication of the difficulty of generating national
energy policy, as is the prognosis for deliberate Congressional treatment
of President Carter's recent proposals.I
State governments also face troublesome decisions regarding the future
of energy development within their boundaries. Particularly in the Western
states, where coal development is progressing or imminent, legislators and
administrators alike have been tried by the dilemmas they face. The North
Dakota legislature's April 1977 compromise on the nature and level of
the state's coal severance tax was the most bitterly debated issue
of their 1977 session and was achieved only after weeks of haggling
capped by an allnight series of roll call votes. The legislature-had-.simi-
lar problems when enacting the severance tax in 1975, and can look forward
to 1979 when the same issue will resurface since a part of the compromise
was to place an expiration date on the tax.
Local governments face some of the greatest difficulties in dealing
with energy development. When municipalities have jurisdiction over proposed
energy projects they must weigh the potential benefits to the community
(jobs, business activity, tax revenue, etc.) against the expected disadvan-
tages (social disruption, overloaded public services, inflation, etc.).
When a local government chooses to accept a project which would affect it,
or when it has no jurisdiction over a project, it must plan to deal effec-
tively with the adverse impacts. Communities often have no control over
energy projects since they are outside the city boundaries or on federal
property, as are most of the mineral rights in the West and all rights to
Outer Continental Shelf resources.
Many local leaders are particularly concerned about the fiscal impacts
of energy development on their cities. When energy facilities come to small
isolated western towns, they typically bring with them a substantial con-
struction work force and a somewhat smaller permanent operating force.
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Each of these new populations makes demands on the local economy and govern-
ment services. Each worker needs a home and the ancillary public facilities
to service it (streets, water, sewers, and public utilities). The substan-
tial population increase causes even greater increases in the need for
police and fire services and, should the workers bring children with them,
the schools may be hard pressed to find places for the new students. Many
of the needs of the new workers are traditionally provided by local govern-
ments and the inability of these governments to provide the services in a
timely fashion is the root of the fiscal problems facing many local govern-
ments in the years of the energy boom.
The siting of energy facilities in rural communities creates many other
impacts on the locality. Land uses are disrupted, social cohesiveness
breaks down, inflation sets in and visual amenities are sacrificed for ease
of construction. The resulting community is genuinely distasteful for
those who live in it. As a result the "boomtown problem" has drawn in-
creasing attention.
The United States Energy Research and Development Administration has
funded numerous research efforts to document the nature of boomtown problems
and identify strategies for coping with them. One such project, the Energy
Impacts Project at M.I.T., focused on defining appropriate roles for state
governments to take when energy development impacts become a problem. The
author has been a research assistant with the Energy Impacts Project for one
year and was responsible for preparation of a case study of the state re-
sponse to adverse impacts of energy development in Wyoming. This thesis
draws heavily on research carried on in this role.
The research effort began with several months of reading prior works
on boomtowns as well as more general works on state land use, facility
siting and development strategies. After developing a tentative case study
outline, the author spent one month in Wyoming interviewing local, state and
energy company officials. As the case study was prepared portions were
sent in draft to those who had been interviewed for their comments. Subse-
quently, a complete draft was sent to those interviewed and others who had
been contacted in the interim. Their comments were incorporated into the
case where appropriate.
The thesis is an extension of the analysis of state aid strategies
contained in the case study. It focuses on a set of alternative means of
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addressing local fiscal problems through state aid and assesses their
relative ability to meet the goals of capital market efficiency, fairness
and state economic development.
The first chapter describes local fiscal problems in some detail.
Chapter II explores justifications for state fiscal assistance to local
governments and develops the three goals mentioned in the previous para-
graph. The third chapter is a catalogue of alternative strategies for
raising and distributing state aid to impacted communities. The fourth
chapter concludes by presenting a preferential ordering of the alternatives
as means of achieving the goals.
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CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF LOCAL FISCAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
While there are many parts to the boomtown problem, much attentioi
has been on the fiscal difficulties facing cities, counties and school
districts in the area of energy facilities. The population which accom-
panies these projects often places severe demands on both operating and
capital budgets. Local tax revenues are seldom sufficient to cover the
new demands since local tax bases do not respond well to rapid growth.
This chapter will describe the nature, size and duration of local bud-
getary problems associated with energy development.
The aspect of the fiscal problem which has received the greatest pub-
licity is a capital shortage. Many local services are capital intensive
and have long lead times from planning to readiness. Since local governments
may not have accurate information about whether or not an energy project
will go ahead, and about the level of public services which will be needed
to serve the increases in population, there is no way for them to effectively
plan for and construct the needed facilities. Even if they have information
well ahead of the expected boom, local governments may have difficulty mar-
keting bonds since their meager pre-boom tax bases would not support debt
retirement and the security of the loan depends on the success of the energy
project. Lenders are averse to risk, and lending in boomtowns is considered
risky.
Local governments also have difficulty meeting current operating budgets
during the height of the boom. The resources of police, fire and school
departments may be put to the test. Where services such as building
inspection exist, local departments may fall behind at a time when the
community can least afford it. Furthermore, most state constitutions pro-
hibit deficit spending by local governments.
Local fiscal problems are often aggravated by the problem of temporal
mismatch between revenue and expenditure needs. Energy facilities promise
substantial tax revenues once they are finished and operating, yet the
greatest need for money comes prior to and during the construction of the
facility. If the community is unable to overcome this lag with borrowing,
the public facility shortfalls may be substantial.
Many local governments face the more serious problem of a jurisdictional
mismatch between the location of a facility and the location of the impacts.
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If, for example, a strip mine is located in one school district and the
families of the workers choose to live in another, the school district which
must bear the burden of educating additional students cannot even look for-
ward to future revenues from taxation of the strip mine. Similar problems
occur when facilities are located in unincorporated areas, thus paying no
municipal taxes, and the workers live in cities and demand city services.
It is difficult to quantify the seriousness of these difficulties,
either to the nation or to the towns most directly involved. A report by
the Mountain Plains Federal Regional Council identifies 179 communities as
being impacted by energy development in the six state region.*(Montana, Utah,
Wyoming, Colorado and the Dakotas.) 2 There are undoubtedly many more im-
pacted communities in other Western states, in coastal areas which expect
offshore oil and LNG development, and throughout the nation where nuclear
facilities may be developed.
The amount of money needed by boomtowns to effectively deal with the
problem varies with local conditions such as the taste for public services,
the ability to tax energy development as it proceeds, the existence of excess
capacity in public facilities, and the layout of new residential developments.
There have been some attempts to quantify the expected impacts of development,
and reference to a few will give the reader a better sense of the nature and
degree of the problems that local governments face.
Moore reports that while conditions vary from town to town, on the
average, a community needs about $5,000 in capital facilities for each new
resident and $1,000 each year for operating expenses.3 It is unclear where
these numbers come from, or whether Moore is referring to additional per-
manent or temporary residents. However, numbers in this range are often
given as "ball park" estimates of local needs.
A more cautious estimate can be derived from the discussion of capital
costs by Intermountain Planners.4 Basing their estimates on detailed analysis
of the public facility needs of small Wyoming communities, these researchers
derived capital costs for several services for each increment of 1,000 in
population. (Per capita figures are shown to facilitate comparison with
the work of others.) (See Table 1.)
* The definition of an impacted community for the purposes of this study
is unclear. It appears that each state was asked to list the communities
that it considered to be impacted. There is no explicit criteria such as
percentage growth or number of new energy related jobs.
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TABLE 1
ILLUSTRATIVE CAPITAL FACILITY COSTS*
WYOMING BOOMTOWNS
Service Cost per new resident
Water $ 580
Sewer 924
Police 10
Schools 893
Total, these services** $2407
* These estimates are in 1973 costs. No expenses for land assembly are
included.
** Not included in the total are roads, bridges, recreation, fire or
libraries. The first three are capital intensive, but cost estimation
without specific local information was judged impossible. In addition,
the level of government responsible for these services varies.
Source: Intermountain Planners and Wirth-Berger Associates, Capital
Facilities Study: Powder River Basin (Billings, MT: 1974.)
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The same study used these figures as well as information on present
capacity of public facilities and population projections to estimate the
cost of needed public facilities in Gillette and Douglas, Wyoming. Un-
fortunately, the study assumed facilities must be built to serve the peak
population, rather than that some less costly or less permanent accomoda-
tions could be made for those who would only be in the cities for a short
while. In Douglas, capital facilities except roads and bridges would cost
$7,675,000; in Gillette the tab would be $35,235,000. (See Tables 2 and 3.)
If there were to be no increases in tax rates, user charges or hook-up
fees, each city would face substantial deficits.* (See Tables 4 and 5.)
The capital cost of over $35 million for Gillette is large for a community
of less than 9,000. Yet, if the population increases to 28,000 as expected,
the cost per new resident would less than $1850. This is not nearly as
large as suggested by Moore. However, when school expenditures are deducted
from the Gillette estimates (since they are the responsibility of the county-
wide school district), the bill of almost $25 million is still five times
the 1973:assessed valuation of the city. State law limits city bonding to
four percent of assessed value. Even if there were no restrictions, private
lenders could not be expected to supply funds when, to meet projected debt
service costs alone, the City would have to tax its present base at fifty
percent of assessed value. The lender would be gambling that energy develop-
ment went ahead as planned and that enough ancillary development occured
within the city to support the bond payments. It must also be noted that
Gillette and Douglas face permanent problems; their tax bases are not
expected to be adequate to cover capital and operating expenses within this
century.
The same study presents similar information for Converse and Campbell
Counties, which include Douglas and Gillette, respectively. On the expen-
diture side the picture is very much the same. The counties would need
to spend substantially more than they had ever spent before. However, tax
* Many stable rural communities finance expansion of water and sewer systems
out of the general property tax and have minimal or non-existent hook-up
fees. When there is little growth the inequeties are minor, but under
rapid groWth conditions, most comunities institute substantial hook-up fees
in order to charge newcomers for the expense of extension. Thus, the short-
falls would not be as great as shown here. Fees for water and sewer hook-
ups often range between $1000 and $2000 in Wyoming boomtowns.
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TABLE 2
PROJECTED CAPITAL COSTS:
DOUGLAS, WYOMING
1975-1990
Total Cost
Water treatment*
Water distribution
Sewage treatment
Sewage collection
Police
Fire*
Schools (within city)
Library**
Recreation
Hospital**
Total
$ 493,000
1,755,000
658,000
2,964,000
40,000
51,000
1 ,464,000
250,000
$7,675,000
* Some or all of the needed expenses are to correct existing inadequacies
rather than to serve new residents.
** Douglas will still have excess library and hospital space.
Source: Same as Table 1.
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TABLE 3
PROJECTED CAPITAL COSTS:
GILLETTE, WYOMING
1975-1990
Total Cost
Water treatment*
Water distribution*
Sewage treatment
Sewage collection
Police
Fire*
Schools (within city)
Library*
Recreation
Hospital**
Total
$ 2,620,000
8,400,000
2,716,000
9,000,000
112,000
452,000
10,447,000
1,127,000
360,000
$35,234,000
* Substantial expenditures are necessary to remedy existing inadequacies
rather than to serve new residents.
** The hospital will still have excess capacity.
Source: Same as Table 1.
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TABLE 4
NET FISCAL IMPACT:
DOUGLAS, WYOMING
1975-1990*
1975 1980 1985 1990
Expenditures on
Current Account 483,000 741,000 878,000 923,000
Debt Service** 562,000 567,000 586,000 586,000
Total Budget 1,045,000 1,308,000 1,464,000 1,509,000
Revenues*** 452,000 654,000 743,000 753,000
Deficit 594,000 654,000 722,000 757,000
* Totals may not add due to rounding.
** Based on projected timing of facility construction and 7% bonds for
twenty years.
*** Estimated by applying present rates to expected bases. Assumes no
increases in taxes, user charges or hook-up fees.
Source: Same as Table 1.
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TABLE 5
NET FISCAL IMPACT:-
GILLETTE, WYOMING
1975-1990*
1975 1980 1985 1990
Expenditures on
Current Account $2,318,000 $4,260,000 $5,347,000 $5,243,000
Debt Service** 2,698,000 2,709,000 2,709,000 2,709,000
Total Budget 5,016,000 6,968,000 8,055,000 7,952,000
Revenues*** 2,280,000 4,284,000 5,402,000 5,295,000
Deficit 2,939,000 2,685,000 2,653,000 2,657,000
Notes: Same as Table 4.
Source: Same as Table 1.
16
bases were expected to respond fairly well to growth since mineral produc-
tion is assessed at 100% of market value for property tax purposes. Thus,
while there would be periods of deficits, these counties could look forward
to surpluses in the longer run.
THK Associates, in a study of public expenditure needs related to oil
shale development on Colorado's West Slope, found capital facility needs
to be slightly over $3,000 per new resident.5 The basis for this estimate
was all services included in the Intermountain Planners study plus capital
needs for general government. The estimates also included land acquisition
costs and payments for the development of a water source, rather than just
treatment and distribution. Streets are not included since it is assumed
that most developers will construct subdivision streets themselves.
THK Associates placed operating expenses for each new resident at
between $400 and $500 for all local (county, city, school district, and
other special districts) governments. The estimate is open to question
since it is based solely on the current per capita expenditure levels in
the area, rather than on an assessment of the needs or desires of the new-
comers. In addition, inmigrants may place greater demands on service pro-
vision than the long time residents. For example, the number of police
emergencies increases more rapidly than population during a boom. 6 This
may necessitate additional expenditures on the part of a town.
Lamont, et.al. used the THK general estimates of expenditures and
revenues to predict budget shortfalls for the ten years after oil shale
development begins for three West Slope counties. 7 The inability to assign
new residents to specific cities or school districts forced Lamont to
present the data at the county level, aggregating the budget positions of
all local governments within the county. This aggregation masks the
severity of the problems some local governments may have, and as energy
developments are placed on the tax rolls, it shows the aggregate fiscal
position improving while those jurisdictions without ratables will still
be in dire straits. (See Table 6.)
When studying the economic impacts of the Coal Creek electrical
generation complex and mine on McClean County, North Dakota, a team from
North Dakota State University placed necessary capital investments for
each new resident at $2550.8 They estimated operating expenditures to be
around $450 for each new resident. Unlike the other studies discussed,
17
TABLE 6
PROJECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
WITH OIL SHALE DEVELOPMENT
THREE COLORADO COUNTIES
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
AND REVENUES
County 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Rio Blanco County
Revenues 2.50 2.59 2.93 3.07 4.22 5.47 9.19 18.09 28.85 39.97 44.55
Expenditures 8.05 4.19 4.12 4.84 19.90 20.92 17.40 15.46 17.16 15.76 13.65
Operating 3.29 3.42 3.52 3.71 6.02 8.14 9.46 10.32 11.29 11.93 12.17
Capital 4.76 0.77 0.60 1.13 13.88 12.78 7.94 5.14 5.87 3.83 1.48
Garfield County
Revenues 7.11 7.36 8.58 9.81 14.32 23.74 28.76 37.06 39.61 41.84 42.40
Expenditures 12.29 11,31 23.59 22.75 23.81 31.60 22.63 21.24 22.84 23.08 23.91
Operating 8.64 9.02 11.10 12.76 14 33 16.80 17.63 18.14 18.81 19.42 20.06
Capital 3.56 2.29 12.49 9.99 9.48 14.80 5.00 3.10 4.03 3.66 3.85
Mesa County
Revenues 24.65 25.41 26.15 27.27 28.59 29.83 31.52 32.99 34.70 36.40 38.17
Expenditures 32.33 37.92 38.32 41.15 46.10 45.48 50.75 51.48 53.96 56.66 59.46
Operating 29.22 30.46 31.58 32.94 34.82 36.24 38.39 40.26 42.21 44.27 46.43
Capital 3.11 7.46 6.74 8.21 11.28 9.14 12.36 11.22 11.75 12.39 13.03
Totals
Revenues 34.26 35.36 37.66 40.15 47.13 59.04 69.47 88.14 103.16 118.01 125.12
Expenditures 52.58 53.42 66.03 68.74 89.81 98.00 90.78 88.18 93.96 95.90 97.02
Source: William Lamont, et.al. Tax Lead Time Study: Colorado Oil Shale Region, Colorado Geological Survey,
(Denver: 1974.)
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these estimates included the costs of streets. After projecting tax
revenues from the plant and increased economic activity, the researchers
found a cumulative deficit for local governments in the county of over
$2 million at the end of the construction phase. During the operating
phase the net shortfall is expected to decline to zero. In contrast,
similar estimates for state government showed the state generating surpluses
in each year during construction and operation. In all years the state
surplus was expected to be larger than the local deficit.
The Legislative Select Committee on Industrial Development Impact,
after an extensive evaluation of the fiscal structure in Wyoming, reached
three basic conclusions: a) with few exceptions, the State, counties and
school districts would experience long run fiscal windfalls due to energy
development; b) in the short run, counties and school districts would often
experience severe budgetary shortfalls; and c) city governments would be
placed in deficit positions in both the short and long run.*
Other states may have fiscal structures which differ from Wyoming's
in crucial ways and cause the local governments to have varying experiences
under energy development. The differences may be in terms of either the
taxes used by each level, or the services typically provided by the various
levels. In Wyoming, counties and school districts tax minerals production,
as does the state. Thus, energy development provides substantial revenue
to these levels of government. By way of contrast, no local government may
tax minerals production in North Dakota, so counties and school districts
are much more likely to be placed at a disadvantage when energy development
occurs. State revenues in Wyoming are boosted by the reception of half of
all royalty payments made to the Federal government for extraction of
minerals from Federal lands. There is very little Federal land in North
Dakota, so the State does not receive much assistance. In 1975, North
Dakota received $303 thousand under the Minerals Leasing Act (or $.50 per
capita), whereas Wyoming received $33,563 thousand (or $95.90 per capita). 10
* The Select Committee dealt with the fiscal structure as it stood in 1974.
Primarily due to the findings of the Committee, the fiscal structure has
undergone substantial modification since then.
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CHAPTER II
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR STATE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO IMPACTED COMMUNITIES
This chapter discusses the reasons that local and state officials argue
for state aid to energy impacted communities. These reasons form the basis
for political support of state aid proposals. The first two sections of the
chapter deal with local and state positions. The final section draws out
of the local and state leaders' comments three general purposes which the
author believes to be appropriate for state policy. These goals will prove
important when decisions must be made on the actual structure of state aid
programs.
Justifications Offered by Local Leaders
Local leaders are faced with problems which many assess to be insur-
mountable without massive outside assistance. While they do not see finan-
cial aid as sufficient to solve the boomtown problem, (technical expertise
and local influence over the course of energy development are also needed),
it is regarded as an absolute necessity. Many communities can point to the
experiences of towns like Rock Springs, Wyoming or Craig, Colorado and the
projections of massive inmigration, overcrowded schools, overloaded sewers,
deteriorating and congested streets, and little, if any, growth in the tax
base. Most mayors, city councillors, and county commissioners would be
glad to accept grants from any level of government, whether or not they
faced serious problems. When they are trying to respond to the pressures
of energy development, their position is simply that somebody must help
them, since they are not in a position to help themselves. Many local
leaders would prefer to have aid come from the state. There is a general
dissatisfaction with the Federal government and a particular resentment of
grant programs with excessive and extraneous regulations, mounds of paperwork
and long delays.
Local leaders point to the substantial economic benefits to the state
from energy development. States are in a position to tax minerals extrac-
tion and they are the recipients of federal lease revenues when resources
are located underneath federal land. Since states can afford to help, local
leaders call on them to fund fiscal impact assistance programs.
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Justifications Offered by State Officials
Many state officials use the same reasoning as that used by local leaders.
State officials are also distrustful of the federal government and dubious
of federal capabilities. Since the citizens of the state who are harmed by
energy development may cause political trouble and local leaders from im-
pacted areas can bacome vociferous, support for local fiscal impact assis-
tance may become a political necessity.. If states are also in a position to
reap substantial benefits from energy development, fiscal aid programs need
not imply cutbacks in other programs and the political liabilities such cuts
entail.
Non-elected officials often couch the argument for state assistance in
different terms. These individuals usually stress the notion that the
state should "set things right," or make adjustments to "compensate" for the
shocks energy development sends through the system. Different things are
meant by statements of this sort. Some officials refer to redressing the
fiscal imbalances created by energy development, wherein some governments
pocket windfalls and others can expect shortfalls. Other state officials
envision a hold-harmless policy whereby the state would ensure that energy
development did not force local governments to raise taxes or user charges
and thereby exacerbate the harms to local citizens. Still others would like
the state to repay boomtown residents for the burdens they must bear, whether
the burden is overcrowded schools or the loss of a sense of community.
Some state officials would also like to see the state act to ensure
local communities of access to capital resources. They see institutional
blocks such as the constitutional limitation on local indebtedness or under-
writers' rules of thumb relating debt to tax base as inhibiting communities
from undertaking the appropriate amount of borrowing. Along similar lines,
some favor having the state take an active role in spreading the riskiness
of lending to energy boomtowns.i The idea here is that, while lending to a
specific city is hazardous because the future of energy development there
is uncertain, lending to boomtowns as a group may be less risky since the
future of energy development is more certain.
Three State Goals
The previous discussion indicates that the purposes of state fiscal
assistance programs are unclear. If the possible state goals can be made
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more clear, discussion of alternative strategies for providing fiscal assis-
tance can be more useful since comparisons of the effectiveness of the
various strategies in meeting explicit goals can be made. State and local
officials raise two possible state goals: correcting capital market flaws
and providing compensation. A third goal, while not raised by officials
when they discuss financial assistance, is evident in the administration
of assistance programs and the intentions behind state siting and land use
legislation. This goal is the orderly development of the natural resources
of the state.
Correcting Capital Market Flaws
Imperfections in capital markets which serve local governments in the
West are a legitimate state concern. The problem has three components: a)
it is difficult for borrowers to enter the market, b) many lenders see
boomtowns as too risky at any price , and c) municipalities must pay exces-
sive (not just high) premiums for high risks. Clearly, the problems are
related; a city which can only approach a limited number of investors is
unable to press for interest rate advantages.
Small, rural communities in many Western states find it difficult to
approach the bond market for several reasons. Many communities have
avoided indebtedness until now and thus have no experience with the mechanics
of floating bonds. Many of the communities which have issued bonds have
been able to use local banks and investors rather than enter regional or
national capital markets. Yet their credit needs under energy development
necessitate tapping a broader market. While the credit needs of the com-
munities are huge compared to the their past experience, they may still be
too small to catch the attention of lenders, underwriters or rating agencies.
There are also other barriers to local entry to the bond market, such as
state restrictions on indebtedness.
Even when a municipal government has found the requisite expertise to
deal with the national bond market, some lenders consider boomtown lending
to be too risky to enter, regardless of the interest rate which the town
can offer. If a community's bonds are rated below investment grade,
certain classes of lenders, such as pension funds, are barred by law from
owning the bonds. Still other lenders have policies or rules of thumb
which preclude their consideration of investments considered risky.
Those communities which are able to obtain debt financing may have to
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pay excessive premiums because their loans are considered risky. Even if
bond rating agencies and purchasers were experts at assessing the potential
for default, it is not clear that local communities should bear the burden
of paying high interest rates, since they are often the victims of the
uncertainty which plagues energy development, rather than the source of it.
Many uncertainties arise from state and federal regulatory actions or
judicial proceedings. These mechanisms presumably exist for the benefit
of the citizens of the state or nation. Furthermore, to the extent the
institutional setting of local bonding can be changed to limit the risks to
the private sector, more funds will be made available for lending in boom-
towns, at lower interest rates.
Providing Compensation
A second state goal might be to compensate those who are harmed by
energy development. Many individuals lose something which they value when
energy development comes to their community. Compensating them for their
losses performs three functions. First, if compensation payments originate
with the beneficiaries of energy development they have the effect of bring-
ing "social costs" in line with "private costs" and improving market ef-
ficiency: those who buy energy development will do so only if the benefits
to them outweigh the costs, including the compensation payments. Second,
compensation appeals to our sense of fair play. If people are hurt by
something which they are forced to experience, it is appropriate to reim-
burse them for their hardships. It is even more appropriate when assistance
is at the expense of those who created the hardship. Finally, providing
compensation to those who are hurt by energy development may be of strategic
importance if they are in a position to block the project. O'Hare has
stressed that, by "paying off" the potential adversaries of an energy
project, the state would smooth the course of the project.11
In order to effectively redistribute between the beneficiaries of a
particular energy project and those who are hurt by it, it is first neces-
sary to identify the two groups. Most discussions of this issue are marred
because they simplistically assume the winners are "energy consumers" and
the losers are "boomtown residents." O'Hare, noting that boomtown residents
are a diverse group, some of whom are not hurt by energy development,
shows that it is possible to say that newcomers (those who arrive after
the boom starts) are better off than they were before the project, since they
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chose to move to the boomtown.12The perfect compensatory scheme would
redistribute wealth from newcomers to oldtimers. Unfortunately, O'Hare does
not differentiate among oldtimers. For many of them, boom development im-
poses burdens in certain roles (i.e., as members of a cohesive community or
as parents) and creates opportunities in others (i.e., as storekeepers of
landowners). The determination as to whether they are winners or losers
depends on whether they Willingly undertake energy development in the town
or do so against thei-r wills. Most case studies of boomtowns report substan-
tial groups within town that favor energy development, as well as groups in
opposition.
We have already determined that the usual characterization of energy
consumers as the sole beneficiaries of energy development is incomplete.
Newcomers, or those whose job opportunities are enhanced by energy develop-
ment, should be considered beneficiaries, as should local business interests
who support development. Two other groups are clearly in a position to
gain from.energy projects. The owners of mineral rights may realize sig-
nificant increases in the value of their property. Finally, the companies
involved in energy development are winners since each project represents an
opportunity for them to make profits. Under certain circumstances, the
citizens of the state or other taxing jurisdiction can be seen as energy
development beneficiaries. When they are able to tax energy development
activities they expropriate a share of the financial benefits which would
otherwise fall to others, such as the owners or consumers of energy resources.
Orderly Development of Natural Resources
The final state goal discussed here is the orderly development of the
natural resources of a state. Most states recognize economic development as
a primary policy objective. Policies for the orderly development of natural
resources should be integral parts of state economic development strategies.
These policies must have two components. First, there must be a means of
deciding which energy resources will be developed, at what times, and in
what manner, in order to maximize the benefits to the state and avoid pro-
jects which are not beneficial. These policies are outside the scope of
this paper since they generally do not involve state aid to localities.*
* An exception is the auction concept which isproposed by O'Hare. 13 The
auction performs both the function of providing compensation and of
choosing between potential sites for energy development.
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Second, the state must oversee development where it occurs in order to
minimize the adverse conditions and assure the timely provision of public
facilities and services which support energy development both directly and
indirectly. Fiscal aid can be an appropriate tool to help provide public
facilities when local governments appear to be unable to perform the task
without assistance.
It must be stressed at this juncture that the three goals advanced
in this Chapter are not necessarily compatible. In particular, the latter
two goals are inconsistent., Pursuing the goal of compensation would imply
rewards of some sort to long time boomtown residents who are harmed by the
intrusion of a project. On the other hand, trying to achieve orderly
energy development often means providing public services to energy companies
or their workers: two groups which already gain from energy development.
Some of the conflicts between the three goals discussed in this Chapter
will become evident as we explore the various strategies for raising and
distributing money for impact assistance.
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CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES
FOR STATE FISCAL ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
This chapte, will examine alternative means whereby a state can provide
fiscal assistance to local governments experiencing difficulties because
of energy development. Specific reference will be made to those policy
options chosen in Wyoming and to the reasons behind those choices. Fiscal
assistance programs involve the identification of revenue sources as well
as guiding distribution. It is essential to separate the two functions for
analytical purposes.
Raising Sufficient Revenue
States can raise revenue for impact assistance from a variety of sources.
For purposes of simplicity, we will restrict attention to six categories
of revenue sources:
-general state taxes
-excise taxes on energy development
-bonding
-permanent funds
-federal aid
-federal lease revenues
Most of these sources can take several forms in a particular state and will
vary between states depending on their constitutional and political history.
Some options, such as borrowing from the permanent funds, may not exist in
some states. Each of the options will be reviewed with respect to:
- Opportunities. Why is this means of raising money possible? How
much money might it raise? What groups or interests are likely to support
using it for impact assistance?
-Constraints. Who would oppose tapping this revenue? How reliable are
future revenues from this source? Are there difficulties of administration?
How does the choice of a revenue source restrict the means of distributing
assistance?
- Experience to Date. Has Wyoming chosen this option? What form has
it taken there? How has the form reflected the unique opportunities and
constraints in Wyoming?
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- Consequences. Who provides these revenues--geographically, over time,
and among socio-economic groups? How efficiently is money raised? What is
the nature of long term state commitments?
Throughout this discussion reference will be made, not only to the
revenue sources in the abstract, but to the specific characteristics of
the sources used in Wyoming. Examples will be drawn from other states
where there is an interesting contrast with Wyoming.
General State Taxes
The broadest of all categories discussed here, general state taxes
include sales, income and property taxes. In addition, for purposes of this
discussion, all excise taxes not related to energy development, such as
cigarette or alcohol taxes, areincluded in this category since the salient
feature of the group of revenue raising mechanisms is that they are neutral
with respect to energy development. The legislature can choose to use
general tax revenues for fiscal impact ass-stance in two ways: institution
of a specific tax for that purpose, or appropriation of money from the
general fund.
Opportunities. A state can most easily use general tax revenues for
local fiscal assistance when its revenues are expanding or it is experiencing
a budget surplus. The political opposition to spending on what may seem
like a very serious problem will be less if other needs are comfortably met.
Wyoming has been very fortunate in this respect, having received substan-
tially increas ed yields from its sales and non-energy excise taxes over
recent years. (See Table 7.) This trend is expected to continue. Under
such favorable conditions, substantial amounts of money could be made
available to energy impacted communities without vociferous political
opposition.
Even if the state is unable to finance assistance programs out of
present taxes, some groups will prefer increased general taxes to energy
excise taxes as the cource of aid to impacted communities. Residents of
booming communities and energy companies will support general state taxes
since that would not reauire any special obligations on their parts.
Enerav comDanies fear taxes on enerav develooment. whereas local DeoDle
fear either no assistance at all. or assistance in the form of legal
authorizations for higher local taxes or bonding levels.
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TABLE 7
RECEIPTS FROM MAJOR TAXES
WYOMING, 1972-1976*
(MILLIONS OF CURRENT $)
Tax 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Sales and use 30.4 32.5 44.5 64.0 66.7
Cigarette 3.9 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.5
Gasoline 16.9 18.2 18.3 18.7 22.4
Total, these taxes 51.2 55.1 67.2 87.3 93.6
* Fiscal years ending June 30.
Source: Wyoming Department of Revenue and Taxation, Annual Reports, 1975-76.
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Constraints. Plans to use general state taxes for local fiscal impact
assistance will be politically more difficult when the state budgetary
situation is tight. Raising state taxes may be politically impossible and
legal obstacles such as constitutional limitations or requirements for
referenda may exist. While these roadblocks can be overcome, to do so
requires a high degree of consensus that taxes should be raised. Financing
local assistance by transferring resources from other programs would also
be difficult. Agencies which must make cutbacks would oppose the new
initiative and seek help from their constituencies and friendly legislators.
Moreover, at times of budgetary stress, agancy budgets may already be
trimmed to the bone. As already mentioned, Wyoming has not faced budgetary
difficulties in recent times, although many other states have.
Whether or not new taxes are contemplated, citizens and legislators
from areas which are not impacted by energy development can be expected to
voice opposition to using general state revenues for assistance to specific
communities. This opposition may not be able to cause the abandonment of
the assistance program. Rather, pressure may be exerted to spread the aid
around. As more communities stand to gain from state aid, more legislators
will support it.
The political geography of a state can also determine the chances of
using general revenues for special assistance. The contrast between Wyoming
and North Dakota in this respect is striking. Impacted communities are
located throughout Wyoming, whereas they are located in a few counties in
the western, unpopulous area of North Dakota. In Wyoming, more legislators
have some constituents who need assistance, and all see energy development
as a live issue. This is not the case in North Dakota. The Wyoming economy
has traditionally been dominated by energy and the railroads although agri-
culture and tourism are also important. The energy and railroad companies
have substantial legislative strength and can be expected to support funding
of impact assistance from general state taxes. On the contrary, the North
Dakota economy is devoted to agriculture and the energy companies are not
politically powerful. It is not in the interest of the farmers to have
their taxes paying for special needs caused by energy development in a
fairly distant city.
The flow of tax revenues into the state coffers is fairly secure, thus
providing a relatively stable and predictable source of money for impact
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assistance. However, from the standpoint of the local governments on the
receiving end, the revenues are not secure if they must pass through an
annual or biannual budgetary review. Under many circumstances, communities
need long-term commitments of revenues (ie. to pledge toward debt retirement)
yet the legislature may choose to spend less on impact assistance at any
time, either because the programs are politically unpopular or because the
other needs of the state seem more pressing. State governments appreciate
flexibility in a budget since it allows rapid responses to new needs and
helps to ensure that funds are spent on the most important programs.
However, that same flexibility causes uncertainties for local government
officials and may place their governments in danger of defaulting on loans.
The budgetary process can be bypassed by a system entitling local governments
to a percentage of the yield of certain taxes. However, this action has
the effect of taking impact assistance away from the pressures of budgetary
review. More or less than is actually optimal may be inadverted allocated
to impact assistance.
Expertence to date. Wyoming has acted to aid impacted communities
through disbursement of revenues from the state sales tax. In 1974, the
Select Committee on Industrial Development Impact proposed, and the legisla-
ture enacted, a revision of the formula for distribution of sales and use
tax receipts to local governments. The share of the tax returned to cities
and counties was increased from one-sixth to one-third of the three percent
tax. The conditions leading to this action were particularly auspicious.
State revenues from the sales and use tax were increasing dramatically and
the Select Committee had projected substantial future growth. 14  Cities in
many parts of the state were in dire need of financial assistance. The
formula for the distribution gave money to all cities and counties on the
basis of sales, so there was no transfer of resources from one area to
another. The Select Committee had made a well documented and reasoned
argument that energy development would cause severe budgetary shortfalls
for cities and towns and would create a surplus for the state under then
existing tax and expenditure patterns. The increased distribution of the
sales and use tax was an appropriate means of addressing that imbalance
without constituting a major shock to the system.*
* Wyoming also has several other fiscal assistance measures, such as the
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Consequences. The distribution of the sales and use tax in Wyoming has
provided local governments with substantial revenues. Table 8 shows the
payments to several cities and counties over the period from 1972 through
1976. These revenues form a major portion of the budgets of many Wyoming
communities. The sales and use taxes respond more rapidly to booms than
does the property tax. Property values increase only slowly during a boom
since many newcomers live in mobile homes and there are delays in placing
new developments on the tax rolls. However, newcomers make many purchases
in the boomtown, often more than the oTdtimers since they are highly paid
and have relatively low housing costs. In addition, the state returns
receipts each month, so administrative delays are minimized. The use tax
is particularly responsive to energy development. The tax is levied on
machinery and materials purchased out of state for use in state and exists
to protect Wyoming merchants. The construction of the energy facility itself
typically generates substantial use tax revenues. If the license for
collecting the tax is held in the county where construction is occuring,
one-third of the revenues is returned to the cities and counties in the
area.
The tax is fair to all state residents since it is, in effect, a
uniform one percent local sales tax which is administered by the state.
There is minimal redistribution between the areas of the state.* If the
state were using general tax revenues to help only boomtowns, questions of
equity would be raised.
The increased distribution of the sales and use taxes to local
governments represents a long term commitment on the part of the state
to make do with less so that the cities and counties may have more. This
action is consistent with expected revenue trends, with the ideology of
School Fofgdation Program 5and distribution of cigarette and gasoline tax
revenues. These distributions have not been changed recently, so they
will not be discussed in detail. The foundation program is based primarily
of average daily enrollment and is thus responsive to increased population.
A portion of the cigarette and gasoline tax revenues are returned to the
jurisdiction is which they were collected, so this source also responds
to growth.
* Some redistribution occurs when residents- of one part of the state make
purchases in another. This is likely of minor importance, although re-
gional trade centers like Casper undoubtedly benefit.
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TABLE 8
DISTRIBUTION OF WYOMING SALES TAX REVENUES*
TO SELECTED CITIES AND COUNTIES
1972-1976**
(THOUSANDS OF CURRENT $)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976***
Sweetwater County
(all governments) 341 419 805 1,365 2,326
county government 38 47 90 153 261
Rock Springs 216 266 510 865 1,474
Green River 78 96 184 312 531
Campbell County
(all governments) 283 304 410 778 1,638
county government 126 135 182 346 729
Gillette 157 169 228 432 910
Carbon County
(all governments) 206 223 309 531 988
county government 34 38 52 90 168
Rawlins 121 136 188 323 601
Hanna 7 8 11 19 35
Converse County
(all governments) 68 75 104 178 435
county government 20 22 30 52 127
Douglas 31 34 47 80 196
Lincoln County
(all governments) 88 86 86 171 359
county government 40 39 49 74 155
Kemmerer 23 23 30 45 195
* Does not include revenues from the 1% option tax.
** Fiscal years ending June 30.
*** On July 1, 1975, the portion of the tax distributed to local governments
increased from 1/6 to 1/3.
Source: Wyoming Department of Revenue and Taxation, Annual Reports, 1975-76.
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maximum local autonomy, and with the excess taxing capscity held in reserve
by the state.
The major limitation on the value of the state tax revenues to local
governments is that money does not arrive prior to the population impacts.
For this reason, it can not be used to plan for and finance public facilitie
in advance. It might be possible to pledge expected tax revenues to retire4
bond issues, but potential investors would have to be convinced that future
sales and use tax revenue would be stable at a level higher than the present
one. A high degree of uncertainty would be uncharacteristic of energy
development situations. The local community is best advised to use new
sales tax revenues to cover the exceptional operating expenses caused by
energy development.
Conclusions. The use of general state tax revenues for impact assistance
to local governments is promising since the state is assured of a fairly
steady flow of funds. If appropriations must pass through state budgets,
the aid is not secure from the standpoint of the communities. When general
state taxes are to be used, political exigencies are likely to make a wide
distribution of the payments necessary. Many states presently have provisions
whereby state taxes are shared with local governments. In cases where many
communities are experiencing rapid growth and the budgetary strains such
growth entails, increases in local shares may be an appropriate -way to
improve the fiscal position of local governments, expecially if the state
tax is more responsive to levels of economic activity than local taxes.
When aid is distributed this way, it cannot be effectively used for front-
end financing of public facilities.
Excise Taxes on Energy Development
Excise -taxes on energy development may al so take many forms. The most
common is the severance tax on the value of a mineral at the minemouth or
wellhead. Special taxes might also be ievied on conversion activities
such as gasification, electrification, or the production of "yellow cake"
from uranium ores. Some states have also considered export taxes on elec-
tricity, although that would be of questionable constitutionality since
states are not allowed to restrict interstate commerce.
Opportunities. When the value of energy resources produced in a
state is substantial, a relatively low rate of taxation will still provide
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significant revenue. The assessed value of 1970 production of oil, gas,
coal and uranium in Wyoming (net of federal and state royalties) was almost
$478 million. The lion's share was the value of oil, over $408 million. 18
Table 9 shows the value of energy extracted from Wyoming from 1970 through
1974. The increase in assessments on oil was caused solely by higher
prices; production actually declined somewhat. A ten percent tax on the
value of energy resources extracted would have raised $48 million in 1971
and almost $100 million in 1975. This compares favorably to the $80 mil-
lion take of the sales tax in fiscal 1976.
Taxation of mineral extraction is politically attractive because the
bulk of the tax is ultimately paid by out of state residents. There are
three groups which might bear the burden of an excise tax: consumers, energy
company stockholders, and the owners of energy resources still in the ground.
The vast majority of the consumers and stockholders do not live in the state
where the tax is contemplated. In addition, much of the coal and other
resources is owned by the federal government, and many other property owners
are corporate entities from out of state.
Political support for mineral . taxation will also come from environ-
mental groups and from interests such as agriculture. They see increased
costs to energy consumers as desireable since it may lead to more demand,
less extraction and thus less disruption of the land and existing economic
activities. They also argue that the state should receive some compensation
for the loss of a non-renewable resource. Since the strip mining or oil
drilling are a "one time harvest" they wish to see some of the value of that
harvest retained in the state.*
As it happens, the economic realities of energy development are such
that taxes which are high relative to those on other activities, or in
other states, can be tolerated. It is not particularly profound to note
that coal under Utah cannot be extracted elsewhere. This means that, while
an energy company may choose to look elsewhere for sources of new coal in
response to a new tax, the owner of the energy resource will still make
every attempt to sell, including lowering the price. Moreover, the national
demand for energy has proven highly inelastic, at least in the short run.
* This constitutes, in effect, a claim that the citizens of the state have
a right to part part of the resources located under the state's land.
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TABLE 9
ASSESSED VALUE OF MINERALS EXTRACTION
WYOMING, 1970-1974*
(MILLIONS OF CURRENT $)
Mineral 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Oil $408.3 $411.0 $386.4 $484.7 $833.1
Gas 38.9 42.9 45.8 56.3 56.0
Coal 12.8 15.2 20.2 36.5 70.7
Uranium 17.8 18.6 26.7 24.5 19.5
Non-energy 27.8 24.2 32.9 41.0 56.6
Total $505.5 $515.7 $512.0 $643.0 $1,044.9
* Federal and state royalties are not included since they are not subject
to local taxation. The rest of the extraction from federal and state lands
is included.
Source: Mineral Division of Department of Economic Planning and Development,
1975 Wyoming Mineral Yearbook, (Cheyenne: February 1976.)
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Even the rapidly rising prices of this decade have done little to curb
growing demand.
Constraints. While the consumers of energy are not effectively organ-
ized, and in any case do not vote in the state which might place a tax on
energy development, the energy companies are a well organized and effective
lobby against taxes on energy development. They will be joined by the private
owners of energy resources who wish to have them developed, since the tax
would expropriate a share of their profits, and by companies that stand to
benefit from energy development such as the railroads which would transport
coal. Energy companies will be more effective in their lobbying efforts in
states where they have long been an economic force. Thus we see greater
participation of energy companies in Wyoming that in North Dakota, and also
witness the lower severance taxes there.
Energy companies and owners of energy resources may be joined in
opposing excise taxes by citizens of a state who expect to benefit if
energy dvelopment occurs. These people would include landowners in possible
boom communities, businesses such as mobile home dealerships, and those
residents who have hopes of finding employment at the energy facilities.
Citizens can be expected to contemplate working at the facilities more
often when they, or their friends or relatives, have had some experience with
the mines or plants. Thus the people of Wyoming may support energy develop-
ment because they can see themsleves benefiting from new employment op-
portunities, whereas the residents of North Dakota find it more difficult
to imagine what it would be like to work in the energy industry, and are
less prone to expect to gain form a new job.19
These opponents of special taxes on energy development are not likely
to be able to completely forestall severance taxes in any state with plen-
tiful energy resources. The opportunity for the state to raise money in a
politically painless way is simply too attractive. However, they may be
powerful enough to restrict the ways in which the revenues from the tax are
spent. Energy companies in particular will attempt to limit expenditures
to the cities in which they operate and to programs which directly serve
them or their workers, such as highways to plants or extensions of water
and sewer systems. In Wyoming, the industry eventually helped write and
supported a coal tax for impact assistance which limited expenditures to
communities impacted by coal development and to roads and water or sewer
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projects that are made necessary by the development of coal.
States do face one difficulty when they choose to tax energy develop-
ment to pay for impact assistance to local governments: the uncertain
level of future yields. Prediction of the yield depends on accurate know-
ledge of both the amount.,of production and the prices at which the resources
will sell. Especially when current levels of production are low, future
production levels are dependent on specific new projects which may or may
not proceed as forecasted, depending on the vicissitudes of regulatory
proceedings, court cases, and the national markets for energy and credit.
Precise knowledge of the future revenues is only essential when it is
desired to commit future revenues in the present. Uncertainty makes these
conitments more difficult.
Experience to Date. Not all taxes on energy development in Wyoming
are intended to provide for impact assistance to local governments, and many
were enacted as general revenue devices long before there was any concern
for the boomtown problem. However, the total level of state taxation of
energy resources is of interest in judging the market effects of the tax.
It is thus necessary to describe the entire structure of taxes surrounding
minerals development, and the justifications used by the state in enacting
those taxes.
Oil and natural gas are subject to the minerals severance tax of four
percent of the value at the wellhead as determined by the Department of
Revenue and Taxation. One half of the proceeds are placed in the Permanent
Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund. The other half is placed in the general fund
of the state. The trust fund was established by constitutional amendment
in 1974 and the severance tax was enacted in 1975. This action was justified
on the grounds that the state deserved reimbursement for the depletion of
a non-renewable resource. In addition, the full value of oil and natural
gas production is subject to the mill levy of counties and school districts.
Since oil and gas assessments accounted for 42% of all property assessments
in the state in 1975, a substantial amount falls to the counties and schools
lucky enough to have active wells within their jurisdiction. 20
In Wyoming, coal is subject to the four percent severance tax and the
local mill levies. The Coal Tax for Impact Assistance constitutes an
additional levy. This tax was established at 0.4% of value for 1974 produc-
tion and was designated to increase to two percent of value for coal pro-
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duced in 1978 and thereafter. In an unusual move, the legislature provided
that the tax would expire once it had raised $120 million. They have since
raised this limit to $160 million. All revenues from this tax are earmarked
for impact amelioration. The coal tax for impact assistance is seen as a
temporary levy to help local governments meet the public service demand
which will result from the extremely rapid development of coal in the near
future.
Consequences. Excise taxes on energy development have raised substan-
tial revenues for Wyoming. The minerals severance tax was 22.1% of all state
revenues (other than federal grants) in fiscal 1976. The coal tax for im-
pact assistance had raised only $1,280,000 by the end of 1976, but revenues
will increase rapidly as the rate of the tax increases and as coal production
expands. Steady increases in the yield of the mineral severance tax belie,
at least for the timebeing, the concern that revenue streams from excise
taxes are uncertain. The future of development, particularly of coal, is
considered so certain that Wyoming feels there is no cause for concern.
Excise taxes on energy development have marked distributional effects.
As mentioned earlier, three groups are potentially called on to shoulder
the burden of the tax: consumers, energy companies, and energy resource
owners. When the owner of a resource has not leased the mineral rights yet,
the imposition of a severance tax will cause the market value of his or
her property to fall. The property owner will see a decrease in the poten-
tial windfall from leasing that is equal to the expected level of the tax.
Since owners of mineral rights are primary beneficiaries of their develop-
ment, this would have the effect of taxing a beneficiary of development for
the public costs incurred as a result of development, if the proceeds of
the tax are used for impact assistance.
When the minerals have already been leased to energy companies or
utilities, the consumers of energy are likely to bear the burden of the tax.
(If the tax is explicitly levied on owners, they might not be able to
pass the burden forward onto their lessees.) The institutional structure
of energy markets varies from mineral to mineral. Coal is generally leased
to coal mining companies, who then mine the coal under contract to utilities.
These long term contracts usually allow tax increases to be passed on to the
utilities. Utility regulation allows a fairly rapid pass on of increased
fuel costs to consumers, although the speed with which this is possible
38
depends on the regulations of the state in which the power is distributed.
Even when contracts between coal companies and utilities do not provide for
price escalation based on taxes, utility companies may be willing to bover
the additional costs since the regulatory process assures them of profits.
Development of oil is generally controlled from wellhead to consumers
by vertically integrated companies. The inelasticity of demand for their
products usually protects them from rising'costs or taxes. Profits of the
major oil companies did not suffer from the trebling of oil prices by OPEC
and will likely not suffer from the relatively modest state taxes imposed
on oil. Once again, when taxes on energy development are passed on to con-
sumers, some of the beneficiaries of energy development are charged for
impacts that development causes, if the money is used for that purpose.
Conclusions. Special taxes on energy development are likely to remain
popular with state legislatures since they represent lucrative sources of
revenue which are often not ultimately paid by the residents of the state
in which the tax is levied. Given the rapidly increasing tonnage and price
of coal mined in many Western states, it is unlikely that legislators will
be overconcerned with the possible volatility of the taxes. Excise taxes
on energy development activities charge some of the beneficiaries of develop-
ment for the problems they cause.
Bonding
The primary feature of bonds is that they must be repaid. It is not
possible, then, to fully consider bonds as a means of providing fiscal
assistance without considering the means of debt retirement. State bonding
efforts can take two distinct forms: direct borrowing, backed by the full
faith and credit of the state; and bond banking, in which bonds are backed
by the repayment of loans which the bonding entity makes.
Opportunities. The primary justification for borrowing by government
in a boom situation is simple. Public capital facilities will be used by
the future population of the boomtown, a group of people which differs
from those living in the town prior to the boom when the facility must be
constructed. Thus it is fair and workable to bond for the public facilities
and allow the users of the facility to pay for it. This justification is
similar to that used to justify borrowing for any public facility. However,
the argument is strengthened by the influx of new residents who would not
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have 'to pay if the facility were to be constructed with current revenues.
Under boom situations it is rational to borrow for facilities even when the
present value of future payments exceeds the cost of spending the money in
the present. Public borrowing allows the actual beneficiaries of public
facilities to bear the cost of providing them.
State borrowing in particular is justified by the frequent inability
of small, inexperienced, booming communities to borrow at acceptable rates
of interest. Most local governments in rural areas have not previously
borrowed in national markets and therefore have not established a credit
history. Local governments may have no experience at the intricacies of
floating bond issues. In addition, the extreme uncertainties associated
with energy development amy make many lenders wary of boomtowns. 21
State bonding to assist local governments may also be justified as a
means of risk management. The risk that any given community will default
is great, because the ability of a town to repay its debts is tied to the
future of a specific energy development project. Lenders may not wish to
take on that risk. However, by pooling many risky bond issues, the overall
risk of default is lessened. The ability to repay loans is tied to the
overall future of energy development in the state rather than to a specific
project, and that future is easier to predict; it is also more sanguine.
Constraints. Most states have constitutional restrictions which either
limit state indebtedness or prohibit it altogether. While these restrictions
can be eased, the route of the constitutional amendment is often a long one,
requiring substantial consensus. In addition, many bonding restrictions are
good public policy in that they discourage overreliance on borrowing. Fur-
thermore, there is long standing opposition in most Western states to the
use of debt instruments by governments. Though there may be agreement that
the specific problems of energy development justify state bonding, it is
unlikely that constitutions will be amended to allow borrowing. In Wyoming,
the constitutional limit on state indebtedness is 1% of the assessed value
of the state, or about $17 million. Since indebtedness is frowned upon, the
state has remained bond free. However, even if the state bonds to its limit,
the amount of revenue it raises will not be substantial.
Even when a state has decided that is wishes to borrow to finance im-
pact assistance to local governments and has overcome the legal obstacles,
it may experience difficulty floating bonds. To an extent, the state is
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subject to the same problems which beset its local subdivisions. Inex-
perience with national credit markets leaves the state unrated and unfami-
liar with the channels used to borrow. Unless bonds are backed by the
full faith and credit of the state, the risk to lenders may still be
perceived as great and could drive up interest rates.
Experience to date. The 1975 session of the Wyoming legislature, at
the same time that it enacted the coal tax for impact assistance, created
the Wyoming Community Development Authority (hereafter WCDA) to issue
revenue bonds for the purpose of community development lending in energy
boomtowns. The WCDA is allowed to float up to $100 million in bonds which
are not backed by the full faith and credit of the state. It may then make
loans to local governments in areas experiencing energy development or to
banks in those areas to relend for mortgages. It was hoped that the creation
of an independent authority would bypass the constitutional limitation on
state indebtedness. Since a much better rating for WCDA bonds could be
obtained if there was no question regarding their legality, the act creating
the WCDA has been challenged in court. The case is presently before the
Wyoming Supreme Court. The challenge has prevented the WCDA from issuing
its bonds, so it has been unable to operate. The legislature intended that
the WCDA loans to communities be repaid in part by local effort (such as
user fees and taxation) and in part by the proceeds of grants from coal tax
revenues. In this way, the tricky problem of providing front-end money to
communities could be solved.
Consequences. The consequences of creating the WCDA can be discussed
only in theoretic terms: it has been unable to perform its primary respon-
sibilities because of the court challenge.
The WCDA is a means of bringing capital resources into the state.
Wyoming has no large banks and must go to the national credit market to
finance its instruments. The WCDA staff is confident that the state will
be successful in that market and that its bonds will be given high ratings
because of the fiscal responsibility of the state. Of course, they cannot
test the validity of their belief until the bonds are declared legal.
As noted earlier, WCDA bonds are to be repaid by local governments
using their own sources and proceeds from the coal tax grants. Thus, one
major source for the repayment of the bonds is the excise tax on coal. This
has the effect of transferring the public costs of energy development onto
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the present and future beneficiaries of its development. In addition, since
local efforts at repayment are required, future residents of boomtowns, the
actual users of the public services, are called upon to share in the expense
of providing the service.
The use of state bonds to raise front-end revenues also has the effect
of maximizing the number of projects which can be immediately built using
the coal tax revenues. It is not necessary to wait for the full amount of
the needed revenues to be collected before a project can be started.*
Conclusions. There is great promise in the use of state bonding powers
to raise revenues for local impact assistance, if they are found to be
constitutional. Bonds can be used to supply front-end revenue needs and to
force the future users of public facilities to pay for them. At least in
theory, the state can act to pool the risks involved in providing public
facilities for energy development communities and to facilitate the use of
capital markets by small rural communities. However, comments about the
potential of state bonding for these purposes must be tempered by the fact
that no bonds have yet been issued, and no loans made to communities.
Permanent Funds
Opportunities. A few states have constitutionally established permanent
funds which must remain inviolate. Often these funds are the accumulation
of the proceeds from rent or sale of public lands and are invested in risk-
free securities, such as federal bonds. This is the case in Wyoming, although
the state has also recently enacted a separate minerals Trust Fund which is
derived from a portion of the minerals severance tax. The trust funds re-
present a possible source of money for impact assistance, although that
would not involve raising revenue in the strict sense of the word. The
Wyoming constitution allows the legislature to make regulations governing
the lending of the funds subject to the requirement that they in no way
may be diminished or placed in jeopardy. Thus it is possible for the state
to make loans to local governments from the various funds, if the loans can
be guaranteed. The permanent fund of Wyoming contained $135 million in
mid-1974 whereas the minerals trust fund had yet to be created. The total
* The issues raised in this section are not the most important ones with
respect to state bonding. Those issues involve the disbursement of state
aid and are treated in a later section.
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amount potentially available to boomtowns was considerably less since over
$40 million had been loaned for long periods and an additional $37 million
in loans had been authorized.22
Constraints. The most severe constraint on the use of permanent funds
for impact assistance is clearly the constitutional restriction against
risking the funds in any way. Since we have emphasized the riskiness in-
volved in making loans to boomtowns, it is necessary to discover a means of
insuring the state against default by the local communities. The same re-
striction means that funds may not be granted to local governments.
Political opposition to the use of permanent funds for impact assis-
tance loans may come from two sources. First, some may oppose the idea of
using funds that belong to the state as a whole for the purpose of helping
some isolated areas of the state. They will see the loans as being too
risky and the gauranty provisions as being inadequate. Opposition on
these grounds has not been a problem in Wyoming. Second, to the extent
monies from the permanent fund are loaned at rates of interest below those
the state could achieve in federal bonds or other risk-free securities, the
return from the fund will be diminished. Since the interest from the per-
manent funds is usually used for support of public education, local districts
and the state board of education may object. In Wyoming, the proceeds of
the fund are used to finance the School Foundation Program. While there
has been no opposition to loaning the funds to local governments, there is
some irritation within the State Department of Education that only $2
million of the fund is authorized to be loaned for school construction
purposes.
Experience to date. The 1974 legislature established the Joint Powers
Loan Program to lend up to $40 million from the permanent funds to Joint
Powers Boards for the purposes of financing public service improvements.
Joint Powers Boards are entities formed by any two or more local governments
for the purpose of providing a specific public service. Joint powers loans
are not restricted to impacted areas since the permanent funds belong to
the state as a whole. However, the preponderance of the loans have gone
to energy development communities since thay are the areas experiencing
growth. Loans are guaranteed by signing over title to the public facility
to the state until the loan is repaid in full.
Consequences. Joint powers loans have made up to $40 million available
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to local governments in Wyoming; the bulk of the $35 million commited by
March 1977 has gone to boomtowns. In the absence of these loans, the
money would have been invested in federal notes or some other risk-free
securities. Since funds are loaned to local governments at below market
interest rates they represent a small subsidy to local governments.
Since communities all over Wyoming are elligible for joint powers
loans, there is not necessarily any redistribution of wealth among them.
Repayment of joint powers loans is accomplished out of user fees since most
of the projects are revenue generating, like airports, hospitals, and water
and sewer systems. Occasionally coal tax grants are used. Once again, the
expense of providing public facilities falls on the users of the facilities,
and to a lesser extent on the future users of energy, rather than on the
present residents of boomtowns.
Conclusions. If a state is lucky enough to have a permanent funds, it
is certainly wise to consider lending money from the fund to local govern-
ments before resorting to borrowing for that purpose.
Federal Aid
One possible source of revenue for impact assistance is aid from the
federal government. Through administrative activity the state can attempt
to increase the flow of grants and loans into the state that are derived
from existing federal programs.
or political action to encourage the creation of new programs which would
serve boomtown related needs.
opportunities. There exists a wide variety of federal programs which
can potentially provide assistance to energy development boomtowns. These
include both programs which make grants and loans directly available to
local governments and other programs which make money available through
the state. A recent document published by the Region VIII Office of the
Federal Energy Administration purports to show that federal assistance to
these two types totaled almost $95 million to Wyoming energy development
communities in fiscal 1975.23However, the numbers reported there are ex-
tremely deceptive. Included were all grants to states and counties for
welfare programs, educational assistance (such as student loans and equal
education opportunity grants) and other payments which are not for the
provision of local public services. Aid in these categories amounted to
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approximately half of the reported total. The survey also included payments
under the Minerals Leasing Act, which is a grant to the state without any
requirement that the money be spent in boomtowns. These are an important
source of revenue in Wyoming and will be treated in some detail in the
next section.
In any case, some programs to provide assistance to local governments
which can be used to solve boom related problems do exist. These include:
EPA wastewater treatment grants, EDA economic adjustment or development
planning grants, LEAA grants, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation grants, and most
importantly, Farmer's Home Administration grants and loans for public
facilities in rural communities. Many state technical assistance efforts
have focused on increasing the flow of funds from these sources into
energy development impacted communities.
Given the urgency of energy development to the nation, the states which
possess energy resources are in a position to lobby for special programs to
assist energy development communities. States are able to engage in genteel
extortion to get the programs they desire since there are many state actions
which could be used to delay energy development or to make it very expen-
sive.
Attempts to increase the flow of federal funds into a state are also
attractive to political leaders of a state since they are an opportunity to
increase the level of public services without increasing taxes. The power
and prestige of those who control the allocation of the money is also en-
hanced. The efforts and money expended are small compared to the potential
for increased assistance.
Constraints. The ability of states to find meaningful assistance from
existing federal programs is constrained both by agency budget limitations
and by the narrow objectives of federal programs. State and local govern-
ments must compete with others for the limited federal aid available as
there is seldom more money than applicants. Most federal aid programs are
geared to specific objectives such as eliminating pollution in streams.
(One exception is the FHA public service loan program, which is intended to
improve the quality of life in rural communities.) If the needs of a
boomtown do not happen to mesh with the priorities of federal programs, no
assistance may be forthcoming.
When trying to lobby fo new federal programs that are more closely
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tied to energy development needs, most Western states are handicapped by
their small size and their resultant lack of political clout in Washington.
As mentioned earlier, this is somewhat offset by the urgency of development.
In addition, Western states have been notably effective in working together
to form a united front on energy issues in Wachington. One example is the
intensive lobbying to override President Ford's veto of the Mineral Leasing
Act Amendments. Success will bring about $12 million in additional aid to
Wyoming in 1977.
Experience to date. Wyoming has actively compained both for funds from
existing programs and for new boomtown related programs. The former has
been primarily the responsibility of the Department of Economic Planning and
Development when it is providing technical assistance to impacted communities.
Legislative priorities have included the passage of increases in the destri-
bution of the Minerals Leasing Act revenues, payments in lieu of taxes, and
the Synfuels bill, which included guarantees for the bonds of local govern-
ments. The first two efforts were successful.
The primary reason for these efforts has certainly been the fact that
everyone likes a handout. Since the cost of attempting to get more federal
assistance is minimal, there is little reason not to try, even if the chances
of success are small.
Consequences. One consequence of increased efforts to obtain federal
funding has been that more funds have come into the state. This is most
clear in the case of legislative initiatives. It is highly unlikely that
the payments in lieu of taxes bill or the minerals leasing act changes would
have passed without the energetic support of Western politicians. It is
harder to demonstrate that administrative actions have increased federal
aid to Wyoming. Some specific grants may have been received due to DEPAD
efforts, but other communities in Wyoming might have otherwise have re-
ceived the money.
On occasion, when the state attempts to bring in federal money, it is
not acting in the best interest of the community. Most federal programs are
not geared to the needs of small, rural, or rapidly growing communities.
They contain requirements or restrictions which are extraneous or even
counterproductive in a boomtown setting. Federal programs may require, for
example, best technology sewage facilities, when the community would have
been satisfied with a less expensive alternative. Federal money may attract
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time, effort, and resources away from the most pressing needs of the com-
munity in order to get federal aid for a lower priority project. Delays
in obtaining federal funds may be especially troublesome to communities
which are growing rapidly and where speed is of the essence.
If federal aid to Wyoming increases, resources have been redistributed
from the citizens of the nation to some group of Wyoming citizens. Judging
the precise incidence of the shift would require information of the source
of the money (cuts in another program, federal taxes, or increased borrowing)
and its destination (general state programs or aid to impacted communities).
Determining where the money comes from is impossible. Even in the case of
mineral leasing act distributions, where we would expect the source to be
obvious, an increase in payments to states means a decrease in revenues for
the federal general fund. Many of the revenues which end up in Wyoming are
also difficult to trace. It is necessary to discuss the appropriateness of
two types of transfers: from taxpayers nationwide to impacted communities
and from taxpayers nationwide to states where energy development is occuring.
From the standpoint of the state both are valid since they enrich the
state. The federal government must take a different view. If we apply the
compensation principals from Chapter II to the federal government the issue
boils down to three questions: a) to what extent are national taxpayers
beneficiaries of energy development, b) to what extent are boomtown residents
victims of development, and c) to what extent are state residents, as a
group, victims. National taxpayers support policies of rapid energy develop-
ment and energy independance, so they can be called partial instigators of
energy development. However, it is consumer appetite for energy, more than
any federal policy, which is causing energy development, so it is more ap-
propriate to finance assistance out of taxes on energy consumption or
production than out of general federal revenues. We have already discussed
the difficulty of seeing all residents of bbomtowns as victims, although a
good number are. We have also pointed out that state taxpayers are often
in a position to benefit from energy development by taxing it. Federal
payments to states are then unjustified, except perhaps as a form of bribery.
Payments to communities are of questionable merit since states are in a
position to help and have incentives to do so.
Conclusions. It is likely that the federal government will be called
on more often to provide special assistance to energy development impacted
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communities. As the need for energy persists, states will be in a better
position to make demands. Furthermore, since the "needs" that federal
assistance is geared toward are insatiable--the state can always find ways
to spend money--there is no reason to believe that future demands for
assistance will be tempered by current victories. The analysis in this
section indicates that federal aid is seldom justified for other than
strategic reasons.
Federal Lease Revenues
One form of federal is directly geared to the level of energy develop-
ment in the state. This is the distribution of payments to state govern-
ments under the Minerals Leasing Act. Since these payments are based on
the amount of minerals extracted from public lands, they merit special
attention.
Opportunities. The Federal Minerals Leasing Act of 1920 as amended,
most recently in 1976, gives to the states in which public lands are located
50% of the federal revenues under minerals leasing. Prior to 1976, the
payments were 37 1/2% of federal revenues. It took concerted effort on the
part of Western legislators to override President Ford's veto and increase
the state share to 50%. In Wyoming, where half the surface area and well
over half the mineral rights are federally owned, payments under this act
have reached $37 million annually.
States are free to spend the minerals lease payments as they please.
The legislative history of the 1976 ammendments strongly indicates the
intent of Congress that the new 12 1/2% be used for planning and construction
of public facilities in energy impacted areas, although the restriction is
not written into the law. Payments under the Minerals Leasing Act are
made to the state general fund and are treated as the property of the
state as a whole, not of the areas in which minerals are being developed on
public lands. These federal grants provide a substantial source of revenue
which might be used for fiscal assistance to local governments impacted by
energy development.
Constraints. The principal constraint on using mineral lease payments
for impact assistance is the fact that they have traditionally not been
used for that purpose. Wyoming has distributed its lease revenues to the
University of Wyoming, the School Foundation Program, the State HIghway Fund
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and a small amount to county road departments in the counties with federal
lands. While the state is free to change the formula at any time, doing
so is politically difficult: the agencies presently receiving money will
fight to keep their share.
It has also been difficult to use the new money for impact assistance,
even though that was the intent of Congress and the stated purpose of
Wyoming in pushing for the additional revenues. The 1976 session of the
legislature deadlocked when trying to derive a formula for the distribution
of the additional payments. The House insisted that a substantial portion
of the funds be spent for a domed stadium and athletic complex at the
University of Wyoming. Even the Senate version of the bill allocated only
a portion of the new revenues for impact assistance, the bulk was to be
given to the community colleges throughout the state. The author of the
Senate bill wished to use the money for that purpose in order to avoid new
state taxes. 24 This controversy demonstrates the insatiable state need for
impact assistance from the federal government; federal funds can always
be used to replace state funds.
Experience to date. The formula for the distribution of the federal
lease revenues prior to March, 1977 is shown in Table 10. The distributions
were made each year from all revenues received under the minerals leasing
program, including both bonus payments and royalties.*
The most recent modification of the distribution formula separates
bonus payments and royalties and treats them differently. Bonus payments
are set aside for impact assistance. Since bonus payments arrive prior
to the actual development of the lands, this mechanism can provide for
front-end revenues to impacted communities. It also serves to hold aside
bonus payments for use over the life of the leases, rather than for
operating expenses of the state in the year the lease was signed. The
distribution of the royalty payments is governed by the formula in Table
11.
Consequences. The new formula maintains the share of the total
federal royalties to each of the previous recipients. (For example, the
School Foundation Program used to receive 50% of the 37 1/2% the federal
* Bonus payments are large lump sums paid at the time a lease is signed
and before any minerals are extracted. Royalties are a percentage of the
value of minerals extracted and are paid annually over the life of a
lease.
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TABLE 10
DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENTS UNDER THE FEDERAL MINERALS LEASING ACT
WYOMING, BEFORE 1977
Recipient Amount
School Foundation Program 50%
Highway Fund (general purposes) 35%
Highway Fund (roads in counties
with public lands) 3%
County Road Departments 3%
University of Wyoming 9%
Source: Legislative Service Office, General Information on Revenues
Available to the State, Counties and Selected Cities of Wyoming, Wyoming
State Legislature, (Cheyenne: September 1974.)
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TABLE 11
DISTRIBUTION OF ROYALTY PAYMENTS UNDER THE FEDERAL MINERALS LEASING ACT
WYOMING, SINCE 1977
Recipient Amount
School Foundation Program 37 1/2%
Highway Fund (general purposes) 26 1/4%
Highway Fund (county roads) 2 1/4%
County Road Departments 2 1/4%
University of Wyoming 6 3/4%
Cities and Towns* 7 1/2%
Impact Assistance** 7 1/2%
School capital construction 4 %
Highway Fund (impacted roads)*** 6 %
* This is a distribution to all cities and towns with a $10,000 minimum
payment and additional funds based on population and school enrollments.
** For grants to impacted communities. To be administered by the Farm
Loan Board.
*** After July 1, 1983 the 6% share for the Highway Fund for impacted roads
will be switched to a "legislative government royalty impact assistance
account." These revenues may be appropriated by the legislature to
alleviate impact problems.
Source: Act #120, March 1977.
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government paid to the state. It now receives 37 1/2% of 50%: the same
amount.) However, the old recipients will no longer receive a share of
bonus payments since they are earmarked for impact assistance. Of the new
revenues, slightly under one half is distributed without regard to energy
impacts. The share given to cities is distributed throughout the state,
as is the portion placed in the school capital construction account.
While impacted communities benefit from this aid, so do all Wyoming communities
and school districts.
The new formula provides some aid specifically to energy development
communities. Seven and one-half percent of the federal royalties received
are distributed in the form of project grants by the Farm Loan Board. Six
percent is spent in impacted areas by the Highway Department and will later
be used for impact needs by the legislature. Most important, bonus payments
will be reserved for impact related needs.
The increases of payments from the federal level did not increase aid
to impacted communities by a similar amount. However, the intent of Congress
was carried out to a degree, since some of the revenues are being used
specifically for impact assistance rather than for general state needs.
One reason that Congress voted to increase payments under the Minerals
Leasing Act was to encourage the states to allow and support energy develop-
ment. The extent to which attitudes have changed as a result of this ac-
tion is not yet clear.
Conclusion. Federal lease revenues are particularly attractive to
states as a source of revenue for impact assistance. They require no
effort on the part of state residents and come with few regulations and
restrictions. For this reason they are desireable for any use. They are
particularly attractive for impact assistance since, in those states which
have public lands, they rise with increases in energy development. From
the standpoint of the federal government, lease payments are not an
effective means of providing assistance to communities since they are
often not used by the~state for that purpose.
Distributing Aid to Communities
Once the state has raised sufficient revenue to provide impact assis-
tance to local governments, it still faces the potentially troublesome
task of allocating the aid among communities and among types of services.
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We shall focus here on four broad classes of distribution mechanisms:
-project grants
-unrestricted grants
-block grants
-loans
Just as the classification of revenue mechanisms tended to disguise variation
within groups, this schema ignores, for the time being, the variety of loan
instruments or of block grant programs which could be advanced. Once again,
a common structure for the discussion of each mechanism will be used. We
will be concerned with four aspects of a distribution scheme:
-Justifications. What are the merits of the proposal? What benefits
does it purport to provide, and for whom?
-Counterarguments. Are there reasons to believe the supposed benefits
would not materialize? Are there disadvantages? Who bears the brunt of
them?
-Experience to date. What has Wyoming done thus far? What arguments
were persuasive and which factions were influential? How did the state
attempt to avoid potential pitfalls?
-Consequences. Which communities or social groups will receive aid?
Which will not? What justifies this distribution of the benefits of impact
assistance programs?
Project Grants
Project grants are made to local governments for the performance of a
specific project such as building a water system or staffing a mental health
clinic. Funding decisions are made by an administrative agency in response
to applications from local governments. The legislature may set criteria
for these decisions; specifying such things as permissable uses, community
elligibility requirements, or grant sizes.
Justifications. The use of project grants to distribute state aid to
energy development communities is justified on several grounds. First,
since the state raises the money, it should bear the responsibility for
seeing that it is spent wisely. While the local government might be a
better agent for the management of a project, it is argued that the state
should decide what the money will be spent on in order to assure that state
goals and priorities are met. Second, by distributing grants on a project
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by project basis, the state can assure that the most important projects
(from the standpoint of the state) receive money, and that only those
projects which actually require state assistance will be helped.
It is claimed that project grants can be more selective than less re-
stricted grants and do not have the effect of either helping local govern-
ments which need no assistance or furthering low priority projects. Third,
project grants are favored when it is intended to restrict assistance to
certain types of projects and that type can only be discerned only by in-
spection of each specific project. For example, political pressures in
Wyoming led to the restriction that coal tax grants could be made only for
projects which were necessitated by coal development, conversion or trans-
portation. Whether an activity qualifies or not can only be determined by
a case by case evaluation.
Counterarquments. Objections to the use of project grants for impact
assistance are threefold. First, it is often claimed, particularly by
local leaders, that local governments are more familiar with the needs of
their constituents than is the state. Therefore, decisions about the uses
of revenues should be made at the local level with a minimum of interference
by higher levels of government. Second, some observers argue that, far
from assuring that state aid goes to the neediest communities, project
grants actually keep the small, poor or less experienced governments from
participating in the grant program. Since applying for grants takes time,
money and expertise, these communities may be ill equipped to make a good
case for assistance to the distribution agency. Finally, opponents of
project grants think other forms of grants are better able to provide
assistance to the most needy, if their distribution formulae are appropirately
structured. They fear political pressure on the distributing agency will
cause it to choose some grants which are not justified.
Experience to date. In Wyoming, the Farm Loan Board (FLB) is responsible
for the distribution of coal impact tax grants to local governments and
state departments. Agency discretion was maintained for three reasons:
a) Some grants were to be pledged toward loan repayment. This could
only be done on a project by project basis.
b) Another purpose was to provide assistance to communities which were
impacted by projects in other jurisdictions. Rather than attempt to
wrtte a formula that would consider these cases, the use of judgement
54
was preferred.
c) Since the money originated with the coal impact tax it was hoped
to limit projects to those actually made necessary by coal development
activity and this could best be done with project grants.
The legislature did not the allow the FLB to make grants for any type
of project that it wished. Rather, assistance was limited to roads (60%
of grants) and to water and sewer systems (40% of grants). In 1977 this
ratio was changed to 50% for each. Since starting the impact tax grant
program in 1975 the FLB has actually distributed $242,500 and made firm or
contingent commitments to grant an additional $24,600,000 over the next
30 years. (Table 12 shows these grants.)
The 1977 session of the legislature also created two new project
grant programs. Seven and one-half percent of all federal royalty payments
and fifty percent of all bonuses are placed in an account for the FLB to
distribute. In addition, the other fifty percent of the bonus revenues
is placed in a legislative impact account which the legislature may ap-
propriate as it wishes for impact amelioration.
Consequences. Coal tax grants in Wyoming have been made to a large
number of communities. Grants have ranged in size from $10,000 for the study
and planning of sewers for Moorcroft, to over $8 million for the construction
of a new highway around Rock Springs. In a number of cases, small grants
have been given to towns to enable them to plan water or sewer systems and
make a full application at a later date. It is hoped that this will prevent
the exclusion of these communities from the program.
The use of coal tax grants to secure loans has been an effective means
of supplying front-end revenues to communities. By pledging future coal
tax revenues to retire either WCDA or joint powers loans, the FLB has
been able to leverage more projects-in the.present with its limited revenues.
Thus, while the coal impact tax had yielded only $1,280,000 by the end of
1976, the FLB has made commitments to grant almost $25 million.
Some local officials and energy company managers have complained that
the FLB tends to "spread the money around" rather than to make grants to
the most severely impacted communities. They consider the pressures for
the FLB to do so as inevitable since the FLB members are all statewide-.
elected officials. Their allegience is to, and their re-election depends on,
the entire population of the state. With an opportunity to pass out money
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TABLE 12
WYOMING COAL TAX GRANT COMMITMENTS (3/3/77)
Total
Applicant Purpose Amount Disbursed Coimmitments
Town of Douglas
Town of Gillette
Town of Hanna
Highway Department
Wheatland and Guernsey
Town of Gillette
Town of Gillette
Town of Kemerer
Town of Douglas
Town of Evanston
Town of Glenrock
Town of Hanna
Ln Town of Mountainview
CA County of Sheridan
Highway Department
Town of Saratoga
Town of Baggs
Town of Glendo
Town of Wamsutter
Town of Glenrock
City of Moorcroft
Town of Clearmont
City of Rawlins
City of Sheridan
Town of Elk Mountain
City of Newcastle
Town of Ranchester
Water and Sewer, Study and Planning
Water, Sewer and Streets, Study & Plng.
Water and Sewer, Study and Planning
Highway: Clareton-Reno
Water and Sewer
Water
Sewer
Water and Sewer
Water and Sewer
Water, Sewer and Street
Water, Sewer and Streets, Study & Plng.
Sewer
Sewer
Highway
Highway: Rock Springs Belt Line
Water and Sewer
Sewer, Study and Planning
Water and Sewer
Water
Water, Sewer and Streets
Sewer, Study and Planning
Water, Study and Planning
Water, Study and Planning
Water, Study and Planning
Water, Sewer and Streets, Study & Plng.
Water and Sewer, Study and Planning
Water, Study and Planning
$ 40,000
28,500
28,500
4,125,000
1,210,910
282,000
621,250
750,000
1,790,225
1,505,414
36,000
452,828
102,156
605,000
8,090,516
2,884,200
99,500
400,000
85,000
2,903,000
10,000
27,000
77,000
30,000
20,000
20,000
25,000
$40,000
28,500
28,500
36,000
85,000
24,500
$4,125,000
1,210,910
282,000
621,250
750,000
1,790,225
1,505,414
452,828
102,156
520,000
8,090,516
2,884,200
75,000
400,000
85,000
2,903,000
10,000
27,000
77,000
30,000
20,000
20,000
25,000
Source: Communication from Mr. A.E. King, Commissioner of Public Lands and Farm Loans, State of Wyoming.
for public projects, the members can be expected to try to please everyone.
Judging whether or not the FLB tends to spread grants to too broad
a group of communities is a difficult task. One aspect is whether the
grants have been made to impacted communities. Of 27 grants made by March
of 1977, only seven were made to communities not on a list of impacted
communities* prepared by the FEA.25 This is not the crux of the local
officials' complaint, however. They feel the FLB tries to give something
to all impacted communities and as a result does not concentrate on those
with the most serious problems. Whether this is the case is difficult to
establish. It does seem likely that many local officials see their own
problems as more acute than others and tend to feel their requests for
assistance have more merit than those of other communities. This could
be the origin of the perception held by some local and energy company
officials that their towns are given the short shrift by the FLB.
Conclusions. The use of project grants must be an integral part of
state aid programs to deal with energy development. Project grants maintain
the flexibility to respond to unusual or unexpected problems. They also
allow contractual grants between the state and a locality so that grants may
be pledged to debt retirement. While the problems associated with project
grants are real, sensitive and sensible administration can overcome them.
Unrestricted Grants
Unrestricted grants are made to cities and other local governments for
them to use as they please. Since there are no restrictions, there is no
need for an application process and no opportunity for administrative
arbitrariness. The size of the grants is usually determined by a formula
established by the legislature.
Justifications.. Unrestricted grants are justified on four grounds.
Supporters claim that local governments are better able to judge the needs
of their constituents than is a bureaucrat from the state. It is seen as
an advantage that the money is not being used to further state goals.
Local officials generally support unrestricted grants because of the extra
* Of course, the list itself is open to question. This writer would have
two other cities which received grants as being severely impacted. In
addition, it is intended to make grants to 'communities which are potentially
impacted by coal, and such towns were not included in the FEA list.
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degree of freedom it provides them. A second argument in favor of unres
stricted grants claims that restricted grants tend to cause over-investment
in the target programs. This is often true from the standpoint of local
governments, but presumeably a state would not create a targetted grant
program unless it thought expenditures should be increased.
The other two advantages of unrestricted grants stem from their
responsiveness to local needs. Whether they are seen as advantageous or
not depends on the overall goal toward which fiscal assistance is striving.
If a goal of impact assistance is to redress a fiscal imbalance between the
state and its localities that is caused by energy development, then allowing
maximum local decision making is desirable. An example will clarify this
point. The research of the Select Committee on Industrial Development Impact
discovered that, because of the tax and expenditure patterns of the state,
energy development would impose severe costs on cities and towns while
providing revenues to the state and to a lesser extent, the counties.*
One goal of the Select Committee's legislative package was to correct this
systemmic imbalance. 2 6 Unrestricted aid is most appropriate since it pro-
vides revenues which can be used for general government expenses, rather
than for projects which are of special interest to the state.
Finally, one goal of impact assistance may be to compensate local
communities because they must bear the burdens of energy development.
Unrestricted aid is more appropriate as a compensation payment since it
maintains decisions in local hands, as they would have been before the boom.
Counterarguments. Objections to the use of unrestricted grants
generally follow the arguments in favor of project grants. Unrestricted
grants are seen as an abdication of the state responsibility to decide how
the money it raises in taxes will be spent. They are seen as neglecting
state priorities and financing actions for local governments which have
little benefit for the state as a whole. Perhaps most importantly, it is
seen as extremely difficult to set a formula which will respond appropriately
to need. The final argument accepts a state intent to provide compensation.
* Cities rely on property taxes which do not respond well to boom develop-
ments because the facility is typically located outside the limits of the
city and new housing is often less valuable than old housing. The state
relies on sales and mineral severance taxes which react well to energy
development. In addition, the state is the recipient of lease revenues
from the federal government.
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The claim is that unrestricted aid will not succeed since no formula would
adequately reflect the present or future strains which energy development
places on public services. Rather, grants should be made on a case by case
basis since this would allow need to be demonstrated in concrete terms.*
Opponents of unrestricted aid generally have the encouragement of
energy development as their goal, rather than compensation. Since they
would like to see the state aid spent on activities which smooth the
progress of energy development, rather than on whatever a community prefers,
they would prefer restricted or project grants.
Experience to date. Wyoming has several existing programs of unre-
stricted aid to municipalities. Portions of the state sales and use,
cigarette, and gasoline taxes are returned to the counties in which they
are collected and from there on to the cities and towns within the county
on the basis of population. The cities are free to use the money as they
wish and aid goes to all communities whether or not they are boomtowns.
The details of changes in sales and use tax distributions are discussed
in the section on general state taxes and will not be repeated here.
However, it should be emphasized that the increase in distributions was
enacted to redress the fiscal imbalance discussed above. It came out of
an effort to help energy boomtowns, but provides assistance to all munici-
palities in the state.
Recent legislation allocated 7 1/2% of the royalty payments to the
state under the Federal Minerals Leasing Act for automatic distribution to
cities and towns. 27 The formula is based on school enrollment and population.*
Once again, aid is available to all communities and no attempt is made to
gove more to impacted communities.
Consequences. One consequence of Wyoming's aid programs is the
strengthening of all municipal governments in the state. The increased
distribution of the sales and use tax has the effect of broadening municipal
tax bases and making them more responsive to growth.
* For example, an agency might conclude, "without this grant either these
streets will remain unpaved, or taxes will rise by X. Either alternative
is considered an undue burden on the community so a grant will be made."
** Revenue is divided among counties in proportion to total school enroll-
ment. It is then divided among incorporated municipalities in the county
in proportion to population. No funds are granted to counties or school
districts, even though they are used in the formula!
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The state has not attempted to write a formula which would compensate
heavily impacted communities more than those with relatively mild impacts.
In fact, no unrestricted money was earmarked for impacted communities.
Thus, there can be no evidence that unrestricted grants are an effective
(or ineffective) means of compensating communities. That function was
left to other programs.
Conclusions. While there are strong reasons to believe, in theory,
that unrestricted grants grants are better for compensating impacted
communities than are other mechanisms discussed here, no state has experi-
mented with grants explicitly for that purpose. Wyoming has not chosen
to use unrestricted grants to local governments as a form of impact assis-
tance, but rather as a general means of revenue sharing.
Block Grants
Block grants are an intermediate step between project grants and
unrestricted grants. A grant is made with the provision that it be directed
toward a particular service or range of services (ie. transportation,
education, or "social services"). While decisions about the exact uses of
the aid are made by the local governments, the state sets the priorities
among broad classes of projects.
Justifications. While the idea of block grants for impact assistance
has not been widely proposed in Wyoming it might be claimed that block
grants combine the most desirable features of project grants and unre-
stricted grants. Block grants allow local officials, who are presumably
knowledgeable about local needs, to decide on the specific activities
to be funded. Yet the state is still in a position to require that funds
be spent in general program areas in which it has special interest.
Counterarguments. A principal counterargument is that block grants
combine the weaknesses of unrestricted and project grants and have weaknesses
of their own. First, it may not be possible to assure that funds will be
spent in line with established state priorities, and still allow meaning-
ful local decisions. For example, in the state would like to build roads
which would service an energy facility and some new housing developments,
it might make a block grant for roads. (It would also have to make a block
grant for roads to all communities, whether or not there were projects that
the state wanted to see built, but that is a different issue.) Yet the
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community, on receiving the grant, might decide to repair roads downtown
or to pave streets in the older residential areas. If the state starts
restricting the grants to leave only the projects it wants, it is trans-
forming the program into one of project grants.*
Local governments find it easy to substitute block grants for local
tax effort. If the general purpose for which a grant is made currently
receives some support from local sources it is relatively easy to curtail
local effort in favor of the grant. While the needs of the boomtowns may
preclude tax reductions, local effort could be directed toward other,
higher proiority, projects. Whereas in the previous objection block
grants degenerated into project grants, in this case they degenerate into
unrestricted grants.**
The administration of block grants may also prove costly since some
state oversight is necessary to ensure that grants are spent in the manner
desired, especially if the state intends to prevent local substitution.
Experience to date. While there has been no support for the idea of
block grants per se, some programs in Wyoming have the superficial charac-
teristics of block grants. Two and one quarter percent of royalty payments
from the federal government are distributed to county governments, in
counties with mineral development on federal land, to support county roads.
While certainly a block grant in form, it is not in intent. The federal
government restricts the use of a portion of the lease payments to roads
and schools, so in order to pass the money on to county governments, the
state had to specify that it be used for roads. Nor do county roads generally
support energy development activities. County roads are typically dirt or
gravel and are built to serve ranches.
The state also distributes 37 1/2% of royalty payments to school
districts in the form of grants from the School Foundation Program. While
the grants are completely unrestricted, the fact that they are made to
school districts limits the uses to which they can be put. There are certain
* For some services this may not be a problem since the state and local
government share goals. Oldtimers' children presumably suffer from over-
crowded schools as much as newcomers do, so a block grant for education
would most likely be spent in a way acceptable to the state.
** There is also a danger that project grants would be used in this manner.
However, it would be more difficult to do so. The administration of project
grants in Wyoming would make it even more difficult since projects are only
funded if there is no local capacity to carry them out.
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elements of the Foundation Program formula (which is quite complicated)
that tend to help impacted districts. .The equalization provisions increase
aid to districts with smaller than average tax bases per pupil. Thus,
should a district absorb additional students because of an energy facility
in another district, (or should the delays in assessing and placing a
facility on the tax rolls keep the tax base below average), the district
may receive partial compensation. Recent administrative changes have also
made it possible for districts to increase their allotments during the
school year should enrollment increase by ten percent or more. These aspects
of the School Foundation Program will not be discussed further since the
first is motivated by a desire for equalization rather than for impact
assistance, and the second is a minor adjustment.
Consequences. The experience with block grants in Wyoming for impact
assistance has been so limited as to render a discussion of their conse-
quences superfluous.
Conclusions. The discussion presented here challenges the use of
block grants in most situations, including assistance to impacted communities.
Block grants cannot simultaneously obtain the goals of local decision
making and decisions made in the interest of the state unless the interests
happen to coincide, in which case either project or unrestricted grants
would suffice.
Loans
Since the granting of a loan implies a commitment on the part of the
recipient to repay the debt, and contracts to that effect must be executed,
a lone program can only be handled on a case by case basis. While it is
conceivable for the state to loan funds to local governments for general
purposes, states usually wish to specify the uses of funds and clearly
establish the means by which the recepient will repay the loan.
Justifications. Many local jurisdictions face only temporary difficul-
ties in financing public services. Once energy facilities are placed on
the tax rolls and the major infrastructure investments have been made,
their budgetary positions are satisfactory. A fuller justification of
local borrowing in a boom situation is presented in the section on state
borrowing. For the purposes of considering alternative means of distri-
buting state aid, there are three salient advantages of loans.
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First, loans to local governments can provide front-end money. Even
if the state intends to allow local governments to repay loans with the
proceeds from grants, the loans can be provided before the state has been
able to raise the full amount needed for debt retirement in the form of
taxes.
Second, loans to governments, when they are not retired with state
grants, avoid the possibility of overcompensating communities which are
experiencing only temporary difficulties. If, after the turmoil of the
boom has subsided, a community will be very well off by state standards,
it is not fair to make grants to it during the boom which would only con-
tribute to that prosperity. Rather, loans, which must be repaid during
the period of prosperity, are the appropriate tool to get the community
through the difficult period and onto its feet.
Third, loans to local governments are the appropriate means of cor-
recting capital market inefficiencies which work to the detriment of small
communities.
Counterarguments. There are three objections, other than a general
dislike of debt instruments, to making loans to energy development impacted
communities.
First, many local leaders claim that loans are not adequate compen-
sation for the burdens of energy development. They feel that just because
future tax bases are projected to be substantial does not mean the citizens
of the city have not suffered or do not deserve compensation. Local leaders
prefer grants or subsidized loans to ordinary loan programs.
Second, making loans to impacted communities is a high risk proposition,
or at least is thought to be. This is the very reason that private lenders
are reluctant to lend in boomtowns. Some citizens of the state might ob-
ject if loan programs were to jeopardize the permanent funds or left open
the opportunity for state taxes to absorb local debts, (ie. through for-
giveness provisions).
Finally, it may be difficult to tell whether or not a specific com-
munity could be helped by a loan or will really need a grant. Especially
if attempts are made to make loans before an energy facility is under
construction, it is hard to predict the revenue and expenditure balances
of local governments in order to make decisions between loans and grants.
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Experience to date. There are two programs of loans to impacted com-
munities in Wyoming. The first is the joint powers loan program, which
is administered by the Farm Loan Board (FLB), since they are the sole
proprietors of the permanent funds, from which the loans are made. Appli-
cants to the FLB for joint powers loans are Joint Powers Boards formed by
two or more local units of government for the express purpose of providing
a specific service. The FLB can make up to $40 million in loans with in-
terest rates between 4 and 8 percent. Since these rates are often lower
than communities could achieve elsewhere, there is some encouragement to
form Joint Powers Boards and seek loans. In order to qualify for loans
communities must demonstrate both an urgent need for a project and their
inability to obtain conventional funding. They must also completely
secure the loan so that the principal in the permanent fund is not risked.
This is usually achieved by signing over title to the facility to the state
until the loan is repaid. The FLB has also been making coal tax grants to
many joint powers loan recipients when the ability to repay loans is. un-
certain.
The 1975 session of the legislature created the Wyoming Community
Development Authority (WCDA) to float up to $120 million in bonds. The
constitutional limitation on indebtedness forced the creation of an in-
dependant authority. The funds raised were to be loaned (with a small
mark up to cover operating expenses) to local governments for public service
needs. (The WCDA also plans to make loans to banks for them to buy
mortgages in rapid growth areas, but that is outside the scope of this
paper.) Applicants to the WCDA must also document a severe need for the
proposed project, the inability to find private financing, and the ability
to repay the loan (preferably through user charges). When loans can not
be secured through reasonable service charges, the FLB can make grants to
cover the gaps.
Consequences. When the state loans money to local governments it
serves as an agent for the movement of capital. If the municipality is
truly credit worthy, private capital markets should be able to perform
this function. However, small, isolated vWestern communities are not well
situated to take advantage of national capital markets. Tools such as
joint powers and WCDA loans are a means of providing these governments
with access to capital.
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The state is not a neutral or disinterested lender of money. With
limited resources, the state can be expected to lend for projects which,
in addition to meeting formal criteria are of some benefit to the state.
Thus, the FLB is seen making loans for airports and hospitals which serve
regional needs rather than solely the needs of the boomtown.
Bond banking agencies like WCDA are caught on the horns of a dilemma.
At the same time that they are expected to make loans only to projects that
cannot find conventional financing (and are therefore probably risky), it
must be sure that it will be able to repay its bonds and convince lenders
of this. Project selection will be a delicate task, but the availability
of coal tax grants and state sponsored reserve funds should strengthen the
WCDA position.
Many of the loans which the FLB has made have been heavily subsidized
by the coal tax for impact assistance. When loans are used in this way they
are no longer simply a means of access to capital. The combination of
loans and grants is also a redistributive mechanism. Since the grants are
financed by taxes on energy development, the effect is to redistribute
wealth from the owners of energy resources and the present and future users
of energy to the present and future residents of boomtowns. This is fair
form the standpoint of penalizing energy development beneficiaries for the
impacts of energy development. However, the use of coal tax revenues to
support public capital investment provides benefits to many who were not
hurt by energy development, :such as newcomers to the town.
Conclusions. Loans to local governments are a legitimate means of
correcting capital market flaws which impede the entry of some communities
into the market. However, when loans are subsidized, either through low
interest rates or grants, they have redistributive consequences which should
be recognized by policy makers.
Summary
The issue which has permeated the discussion of strategic alternatives
in this chapter is one of entitlements. What is the proper distribution
of costs and benefits from energy development? Discussion of the distri-
butive impacts of various actions can identify the winners and losers
with some precision. Discussion of whether the winners are entitled to
their winnings or the losers should be reimbursed for their losses requires
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an overall conception of what a just outcome or system would look like.
One such conception is the perfect market paradigm of economists. The
essential assumptiom of that system, from the standpoint of studying the
boomtown problem, is that all goods (or bads) must be exchanged at a
competitively determined price. When there are externalities, such as
the impacts of energy development, it is necessary for the government to
step in and establish prices for those goods.
This was the paradigm underlying our assessment of the desirability
of redistribution from energy consumers to long term residents of boom-
towns. If one is pleased with the initial distribution of wealth, systems
with appropriately administered prices for those goods which a market
cannot price will perform fairly well.
However, since these prices are administered as taxes and subsidies
by units of government whose interest diverge from "society's" there is
little reason to expect that prices will be set at appropriate levels. It
is not in Wyoming's interest to tax energy development at a level equal to
the adversities it must face. Rather, it is in Wyoming's interest to tax
energy at the highest level the market will bear. Similarly, it is not in
the federal government's interest to grant Wyoming sufficient revenue to
cover the advantages to federal taxpayers from energy development there.
It is in the interest of the federal government to give Wyoming as little
as possible, without jeopardizing energy production. If Wyoming is able
to stop energy development, the federal government may have to pay substantially
more than is "justified" by the principles of administered prices.
The tax and subsidy decisions are set, not by reference to actual costs
and benefits (except as a rationalization), but by the relative power of
the participants. Under those circumstances, the outcome may bear no re-
semblence to the economic notion of optimality.
When administered prices abound it is a mistake to place too much
faith in the existing distribution of wealth and seek only to redress
changes which occur. For example, were Wyoming to stop giving mineral
leasing revenues to the School Foundation Program in order to fund impact
assistance, a real redistribution between the children of the state and the
citizens of boomtowns would occur. It would be difficult to justify this
action by our criteria, yet it might be more difficult to justify the
original decision to distribute the revenues to statewide education, or
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even the decision to grant Wyoming the revenues.
An elaborate system of entitlements has been politically established.
Few would defend the entire system as being rationally constructed or just.
The system of. rights and responsibilities is changed daily by governmental
actions, and the workings of the economy favor different groups at different
times. An event like energy development, which enriches some as it impoverishes
others, is not out of the ordinary. Consideration is given to compensating
individuals for suffering energy development because we feel that the losses
are substantial and that they are undeserved.
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CHAPTER IV
CHOOSING AMONG THE ALTERNATIVES
At this point it is appropriate to consider an ordering of preferences
among the alternatives in light of the goals which were posited in the
second chapter. As we expected, different alternatives are effective in
achieving different goals. Decisions as to the set of strategies which a
state will use should be made by legislators who are able to weigh the
relative importance of these and other goals to the state and are cognizant
of the probable implications of the alternatives for meeting the goals.
Correcting Capital Market Flaws
Attempts to correct or circumvent the inefficiencies in national capital
markets which work to the disadvantage of booming communities should avoid
disrupting the market in more fundamental ways. A state should also prefer
not to take on contingent liabilities if there are less risky means of pro-
viding access to capital markets. For these reasons, borrowing from the
permanent funds is the preferred means of raising ravenue. By shifting
some of the assets of the state into local debt, the state directly increases
the flow of investment into impacted communities and stems the flow of
investment out of state. There are two difficulties with the strategy.
First, not all states have permanent funds. Second, the permanent funds
are generally regarded to be held in trust for all the people of the state,
so it may be politically difficult to target assistance to communities which
are experiencing energy development. In states where non-booming local
governments also have difficulty marketing their bonds, however, assistance
on a statewide basis may be justified.
A second choice, for those states with federal land in them, is to use
federal lease bonus payments as a source of capital. The advantage of bonus
payments is that they arrive in one large lump sum when a lease is signed,
rather than over the active life of the lease; the money is available
before impacts are felt and can create public facilities in anticipation of
population growth, the benefits of which will be enjoyed for many years.
Using bonus payments in this way is also preferable to spending them all in
the year they are received for the operating expenses of state agencies.*
* Federal lease payments originate out of state and do not impose a burden
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A third, and still attractive means of providing local access to capital
is for the state, or an agency of the state, to issue bonds. This strategy
is less attractive to a state than using permanent funds or bonus payments
since the state must seek out new sources of capital and assume the respon-
sibility to repay the notes in the event of local default.
The use of taxation to raise money for correcting capital market
failures would probably not be effective since a substantial fund should
be available and there are many current needs for state revenue. This
would not rule out the gradual creation of a revolving fund out of state
taxes which would be used to make loans to communities. In fact, that
strategy is similar to using the permanent funds, which are simply an
accumulation of rental and sales revenues from the trust lands. However,
such a device would be a long term approach to correcting capital market
failures which affect small towns, rather than an immediate response to the
problems of boomtowns.
Among the distribution mechanisms discussed in this report, loans are
the only appropriate means to address capital market failures.** Providing
a community with a loan is responsive to the nature of the problem: a
credit worthy government has been unable to obtain credit from traditional
sources. Although local governments would sertainly prefer grants to loans,
grants would perform a redistributive function. While there is nothing
intrinsically wrong with redistributing wealth, in many situations it is
called for, it should not occur as an unintended side effect of other
policies. Redressing capital market flaws is not a legitimate reason to
make grants to impacted communities.
Providing Compensation
If the purpose of compensation is to redistribute wealth from the
beneficiaries of energy development to those who suffer from it, excise
taxes on energy development are the preferred means of raising revenue.
on the residents of a state as a group. However, once the federal govern-
ment has been persuaded to make payments to the state, there is an oppor-
tunity cost to state citizens associated with using the money for impact
assistance; the state could use the federal money for other purposes.
** The state might help some governments by easing legal restrictions on
borrowing. For some communities this would not help since they have been
unable to sell bonds even though they are below the legal limit.
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Excise taxes can directly penalize the activity which is creating the
problem. However, most energy excise taxes fail to tax some of the groups
of beneficiaries. The most common energy tax, the severance tax, is ul-
timately paid by the resource owners and consumers. Energy companies,
newcomers, businesses and workers who will gain indirectly are spared
by a severance tax. Other mechanisms might be devised to tax some of these
groups, however. For example, there might be an excise tax on energy
company profits or a license fee for working in an energy facility. However,
as the group of beneficiaries becomes more diffuse it becomes more difficult
to tax them according to the benefits they actually receive.
The proceeds of federal lease revenue payments to states are also
useful for compensation since they vary with the level of energy develop-
ment. Whether the -use of federal lease revenues constitutes a redistribution
from winners to losers is open to debate. The issue depends on a judgement
as to the 'rightful' ownership of the federal revenues.
The third choice for raising compensation money is federal grants.
Grants would be favored by the state since they originate with federal tax-
payers. However advantageous this may be to the state, it is not necessarily
a tax on the beneficiaries of energy development, except insofar as taxpayers
gain satisfaction from 'energy independence.'
General state taxes could provide the necessary revenue, but it is
hard to justify taxing the people of the entire state for the benefit of a
few, especially if the citizens of the state are not considered to benefit
from energy development.
Bonding could raise large amounts of money for substantial compensation
payments at the outset. However, it would still be necessary to raise money
to repay the bonds, and this would require the use of another strategy which
would be the actual source of the compensation payments. The use of bonds
does have one feature to commend it: the benefits of energy development
accrue to the owners, consumers and energy companies for many years into -
the future, yet the adverse impacts are felt immediately. When bonding
is coupled with taxation of the beneficiaries, those paying the taxes can
support the same compensation payment with smaller taxes over many years
rather than being hit by a stifling tax or fee at the outset of a project.
It is not clear that there is a fair means of compensating those who
are hurt by energy development by payments to the governments where they
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live. In the second chapter, three reasons for providing compensation were
discussed: fairness, efficiency (bringing private costs to the supporters
of energy development in line with social costs), and currying local favor
for projects. Providing payments to local governments does not ensure fair
compensation since all who choose to live in the town will be free to enjoy
the fruits of the payment, while those who find boomtown conditions intoler-
able and wish to move out cannot take the compensation. More generally,
the services which governments provide cannot be sold for cash in order to
purchase the goods which the intended recipient would rather have had.
Since many who do not deserve aid may reap the benefits, a payment large
enough to adequately compensate the truly aggrieved will place an undue
burden of the groups providing the revenue. One set of development bene-
ficiaries will be called on to aid another.
The conventional wisdom is that efficient allocation is not furthered
when those who suffer from a public externality are compensated for it.
Baumol and Oates argue that to compensate the victims leaves them with no
incentive to avoid the adverse conditions and actually pays them to suffer
when it might be more efficient to leave.28 This analysis does not hold in
the boomtown case. As long as lump sum payments are made before development
occurs, and there is no further opportunity to receive compensation, indi-
viduals would have the same incentives to depart as they did without the
compensation. However, this argument does imply that individuals should be
compensated for the lesser of the two evils they face: living in a boom-
town or moving from their hometowns.*
From the standpoint of obtaining local approval for energy projects,
payments to local governments may actually be more advantageous than pay-
ments to individuals. Since specific favorable governmental actions are
required, rather than the general goodwill of the community, payments to
the government would be as effective. Grants are very popular with local
leaders since they allow local leaders to increase services without raising
taxes. Even if there are long term reasons for gaining the goodwill of the
community, providing visible public services would probably be more effective
than payments to individuals. After the boom has started, many of the members
* Boomtowns illustrate a gap in the Baumol and Oates thesis. If compen-
sation is paid to victims of a public externality at the time when the
hardship is imposed, and all others are judged inelligible for compensation,
fairness can be achieved without sacrificing efficiency.
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of the community are newcomers who would be inelligible for compensation.
The provision of a public service is a "gift that keeps on giving" and may
be more effective at gaining long term local support.
It is likely that state policy makers will continue to favor programs
of aid to local governments. Aid to governments is an old and respected
tradition, whereas aid to non-impoverished individuals is not. Legislators
from non-impacted communities, who might go along with payments to local
governments to meet public service needs, would balk at the notion of
payments to selected individuals. The Director of the North Dakota Coal
Impact Office claims that there is no possibility that the state would
make payments to individuals in boomtowns, and that to do so would be un-
constitutional. 29 This prediliction would indicate that state officials
are not actually concerned with providing meaningful compensation. Pay-
ments which are made to local governments in order to smooth the course
for energy development or to meet state policy goals can be called com-
pensation in order to appease local residents.
If payments to local governments are to be accepted as a second best
means of providing compensation, an ordering among the distribution
strategies is possible. Unrestricted grants to local governments are
the preferred alternative since that allows the citizens of the town to
decide how their compensation will be spent.* After unrestricted grants
in priority are block grants since they may be used relatively freely and
can also substitute for local tax effort. Project grants are not an attrac-
tive alternative unless they are meant to be used for projects which
specifically serve the long term residents, an eventuality which we con-
sider unlikely since the state is primarily interested in providing services
for energy development. Loans are inappropriate for compensation purposes.
However, if the benefits from a loan can be enjoyed before the newcomers
arrive and the loan repaid by the future residents, redistribution of the
type desired has occured.
* Under certain circumstances unrestricted grants would be unfair to the
intended recipients. If newcomers have already become powerful in the
community when the grant is received, they can be expected to fund programs
which meet their needs. Thus, compensatory payments must be made before
the major influx of new residents arrives.
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Orderly Development of Natural Resources
When state aid to energy impacted communities is intended to ensure
orderly development the revenue source is not particularly important to
the achievement of that goal. It might be argued that excise taxes on
energy distort the market and preclude efficiency. However, the same groups
which stand to gain from energy development also would benefit from state
actions to make that development process more orderly by providing public
services in boomtowns, so a tax on energy would not be unfair. Moreover,
the state can use tax levels to effect the rate of minerals development,
keeping it at manageable levels. If appropriately administered, excise
taxes on energy development can be a tool for achieving the goal of orderly
development.
From the state's standpoint, federal lease revenues are a preferable
alternative since there are few restrictions of use. Yet there is likely
to be opposition from the present recipients of the money. Energy excise
taxes are popular because they are paid primarily by people from out of
state and conform to the principal of benefit taxation if used to smooth
the development process. When localities will eventually have plenty of
tax revenue, loans are a convenient tool;this may call for tapping the
permanent funds or state bonding.
Project grants, unrestricted grants and loans are all necessary in-
gredients of an effective distribution strategy. Each has a role to play.
Since boom development places unprecedented strains on all local operating
expenses and it is in the interest of the state that local services remain
viable, unrestricted grants are needed. Unrestricted grants are preferred
for this purpose since there is no compelling reason for the state to
interfere with local allocational decisions. However, grants must be made
in such a way as to favor those communities with the most severe hardships.
Loans can be used to provide access to capital, but they may also be sub-
sidized to allow non-credit worthy governments to obtain front end money.
By subsidizing the interest the state is recognizing the statewide benefits
of orderly development. Project grants are also needed to provide funding
for important facilities where local govenrments would be unable to repay
loans, even with an interest subsidy.
The management of a many faceted program such as this one requires
two devices: a formula for the distribution of unrestricted aid to booming
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communities which favors those that are hardest hit, and an agency or board
to decide on local requests for loans or grants. The agency must be able
to assess the need for the facility and the ability of the community to
repay loans in order to decide the conditions under which each separate
aid package will be disbursed.
Summary
The local impacts of energy development include social disruption,
inflation, housing shortages, and aesthetic deterioration. However, the
aspect of the boomtown problem which has been most troublesome to state and
local officials is the strain placed on local budgets. Newcomers demand
public services, but often local tax bases do not keep pace with the needs.
Local governments have difficulties meeting both needed capital and opera-
ting expenditures. For some governments the problems are short lived; as
new developments are placed on the tax rolls their budgets stabilize.
Others face a much more serious problem, the energy facility may be outside
the jurisdiction, and hence pay no taxes to the community, yet the workers
choose to live there.
In energy rich states, local leaders facing severe fiscal strains
have called on state governments to provide assistance. There are three
possible goals for state programs of fiscal assistance to boomtowns. States
may wish to: correct capital market failures, compensate those who suffer
from energy development impacts, or ensure an orderly development process by
providing public services when they are needed.
Any fiscal impact assistance program must both raise money and distribute
it to the intended recipients. We have reviewed several possible sources
of revenue: general state taxes, excise taxes on energy development, bonding,
permanent funds, federal aid and federal lease revenues. Four techniques
for distributing aid were considered: project grants, unrestricted grants,
block grants and loans. Our discussion of the distributional impacts of
alternative means of raising and distributing revenues highlighted the im-
portance of an overall conception of an appropriate distribution of the
costs and benefits of energy development. Without such a conception, the
distributive impacts can be evaluated but no normative judgement on their
validity can be made.
The final chapter has presented a preferential ordering of the various
mechanisms based on their ability to help achieve each of the goals.
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APPENDIX
COMPENDIUM OF STATE RESPONSES TO BOOMTOWN PROBLEMS IN WYOMING
State government has reacted to the problems associated with boomtown
development in many ways. Solutions or responses include automatic adminis-
trative actions, discretionary administrative actions, and legislative ap-
proaches.
Automatic Administrative Responses
Automatic responses which occur under existing statutes and procedures
in response to changing conditions. For example, funds distributed to local
units of government on the basis of service needs or sales automatically in-
crease as a boom develops. In Wyoming, the School Foundation Program dis-
tributes funds to local school districts according to a formula based on
average daily membership in the district, as well as special needs including
transportation, homebound children, or vocational programs. Approximately
35% of all public school expenditures derive from state aid, primarily from
the Foundation Program formula. This formula tends to equalize expenditures
by increasing aid to districts with below average tax bases per student.
Thus, districts which experience increased enrollments without increased
assessments, either because developments are in other districts or because
they have yet to be assessed, receive partial compensation from the state.
The Department of Education also makes adjustments in state aid levels during
the school year should attendence levels rise dramatically.
A portion of all sales tax revenues is returned to the county from
which it was collected and then split between the cities and county accor-
ding to population. Since sales respond very quickly to population increases,
and since revenues are returned to local units of government each month,
this source of income responds quickly to growth. - Portions of state receipts
from gasoline and cigarette taxes are distributed in a similar manner.
Discretionary Administrative Actions
Administrative departments have some discretion. In Wyoming they can
provide technical assistance to selected communities and reorder departmental
priorities to favor communities experiencing energy development impacts.
The principal agency engaged in providing technical assistance to locali-
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ties is the Department of Economic Planning and Development (DEPAD). They
have helped assess the needs for various services and provided aid in seeking
and applying for federal grants, in locating technical expertise, and in
providing management guidance.
Several state agencies, with DEPAD serving as the lead agency, have
recently generated a pilot project to provide technical assistance to local
governments in the Kemmerer-Evanston area in the southwestern part of the
state.This area is expecting trona expansion, coal development in the Green
River Basin, and exploration for oil and natural gas in the Overthrust Belt
on the Utah border to cause additional growth. The project is in its third
phase. The state agencies involved have inventoried the public facilities
in the area to identify present deficiencies and strains which growth might
cause. The state, federal and local participants are now prepared to develop
specific action proposals. The heavy involvement of state and federal agen-
cies at early stages does not imply a commitment of funds. The project is
now heading toward the design of programs to increase the management capabi-
lities of local governments, rather than toward major spending programs.
The hope is that improved management can leverage more services at the same
cost. In addition, grants or other fiscal assistance could be more produc-
tive with improved management. Along these lines, local governments in
Lincoln and Uinta counties have formed an Association of Governments to
coordinate planning.
The Department of Education has helped to prepare enrollment projections,
although they have little faith in their own numbers since energy development
is so uncertain. However, they consider projections for the Kemmerer-Evanston
area to be better because of cooperation with the State Planning Coordinator's
Office. The DOE also provides assistance in planning curriculum changes
which energy development may make appropriate. The Division of Water Quality
within the Department of Environmental Quality has analyzed and attempted
to improve sewerage plans as a part of its administration of federal grant
programs. Since many energy impact communities will be needing sewer systems
and sewage plants for the first time, this assistance may be very valuable.
Several state agencies have reordered priorities to favor boom communities.
Population increases which cause increased use of recreation facilities have
affected the operations of the Recreation Commission, the Game and Fish Com-
mission, and federal agencies such as the Park Service, the Forest Serviice
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and the Bureaus of Land Management, Reclamation, and Outdoor Recreation. The
Recreation Commission, draws up a State Comprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plan
that is meant to guide the actions of these agencies. The most recent of
these plans takes into consideration the increased needs of rapid growth
areas and attempts to funnel recreation funds to them.
The Division of Water Quality has a specific concern for the quality
of water in streams and has responsibility for the allocation of federal (EPA)
water quality grants in the state. They have recently revised their criteria
for setting allocation priorities to consider population imnpact because of
water quality problems that many boomtowns experience. This has had the effect
of raising projects in boom communities to higher positions on the list of
projects to be funded.
Optional Sales Tax
In 1973 the legislature allowed individual counties to impose a 1%
sales tax, by referendum, in addition to the state's 3% sales tax. The
tax may only be instituted for a period of two years after which it must
be submitted to another referendum. Several local officials comment that
this provision has been the single state action most crucial to solving their
areas problems. Seven counties have made use of the tax to date.
Joint Powers Act
The 1974 session of the legislature enacted a Joint Powers Act to allow
local governments to form Joint Powers Boards. The Boards can undertake
projects that individual governments might not be able to afford. The Act
also allows $40 million in loans to Joint Powers Boards from the permanent
funds of the state. The Farm Loan Board (FLB) which consista of the five
elected statewide officials, (Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor, Treasurer
and Superintendant of Instruction) has constitutional authority over the
permanent funds and makes all decisions regarding loans. Since loans are
available below market interest rates they provide an inducement to the for-
mation of Joint Powers Boards. Since the loans are from the permanent fund,
which may not not be risked in any way, the FLB requires that titles to land
and structure be transferred to the state as security. The Attorney General
must approve such transfers. Most joint powers loans have been made to areas
experiencing growth due to energy development.
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Wyoming Community Development Authority Act
The WCDA was empowered to float up to $120 million in tax-free revenue
bonds, the proceeds of which were to be used to finance public facilities and
housing. Since the state is not allowed to issue general obligation bonds
in excess of 1% of its assessed valuation, the bonding authority of the WCDA
has been challenged in the courts and the WCDA has been unable to operate.
Some joint powers loans made by the FLB may be repurchased by the WCDA at a
later date if the projects would be more appropriate under the WCDA. It was
assumed by the Select Committee, though not explicitly stated in its report,
that the WCDA staff would become the state level experts on the needs of
communities affected by energy development. It was thought that the WCDA
would be able to evaluate proposals on the basis of need, importance and
financial soundness and that it would be able to keep accurate and up-to-
date records so as to most efficiently use the funds at the state's disposal.
It was also hoped that the WCDA would assist in the review of applications
to other state agencies, particularly the FLB.
Increased Sales Tax Distribution
This provision increased from one-sixth to one-third the portion of the
3% sales tax automatically returned to the political subdivisions of the
state. As mentioned earlier, the sales tax forms a significant portion of
local revenues and is responsive to growth.
Imposition of a Coal Tax for Impact Assistance
The legislature created a special severance tax on coal which phases in
with progressively higher rates, reaching 2% of value in 1978. Originally,
the tax was designed to expire once it had raised $120 million; this has now
been increased to $160 million. The FLB is authorized to disburse these
funds to areas that are either directly or indirectly affected by coal develop-
ment. The legislation restricted grants for use on highways, road or street
improvements, or water and sewer projects. The Select Committee intended
that the grants be used primarily as pledges to pay portions of WCDA loans
to communities that would be unable to repay the loans out of user charges
or local tax revenues. The Committee also wanted the WCDA to evaluate ap-
plications for these grants. The WCDA was not allowed to make decisions
on grant proposals because the Select Committee felt that grant decisions
80
would become politicized and wished to avoid politicizing the Authority.
Therefore, the FLB, which is made up of elected officials, was given
jurisdiction over the grants.
Land Use Planning Act
In 1975 the legislature enacted the Land Use Planning Act which
created a Land Use Advisory Committee (to represent county interests),
a Land Use Commission and the Office of Land Use Administration to pro-
vide staff assistance. The Act mandated local planning for the first time
and provided financial assistance of up to $20,000 over two years for each
county to prepare the land use plans (defined in the Act as "any written
statement of land use policies, goals and objectives adopted by local
governments.") Local plans are to be consistant with goals, policies and
guidelines promulgated by the State Commission and are subject to Commis-
sion approval. Should a county not submit an acceptable plan, the Commission
must prepare an "appropriate land use plan using goals established by the
local governmental units." The Act also provides for the designation of
areas of critical or more than local concern. The Commission may assist
local governments in planning for and regulating critical areas after set-
ting state guidelines. The Commission has general powers of enforcement
but the Act does not specifically allow it to regulate land use in critical
areas. Thus, its powers are unclear.
The Commission has adopted goals, policies and guidelines and most
counties are preparing preliminary plans to meet the June 30, 1977 dead-
line. Given the ubiquity of energy development, most county plans will
have to consider means of accomodating population increases associated
with energy facilities. Counties are being encouraged to plan for their en-
tire land area, including federal lands within their jurisdiction where the
regulatory power of the state is in doubt. Since federal agencies are
supposed to consider local plans when making land use decisions, the existence
of explicit plans will improve the bargaining position of local governments.
Mineral Trust Fund
In 1974 the legislature proposed an amendment to the Wyoming Cons-
titution (adopted in November of that year by the voters) providing for a
mineral excise tax equivalent to 1 1/2% of the gross value of production.
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These funds are placed in the Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund. Al-
though the Fund is inviolate, the income from it is deposited in the general
fund and the legislature may specify conditions under which monies in the
Fund may be lent to political subdivisions. In 1975, the legislature im-
plementated this amendment, and increased the tax to 2% for the Mineral
Trust Fund and 2% for the general fund.
The Industrial Development Information and Siting Act
The 1975 session of the legislature enacted the Wyoming Industrial
Development Information and Siting Act. The Act created an Industrial
Siting Council and the Office of Industrial Siting Administration, within
the Office of the Governor, to serve as staff to the Council. The Siting
Act requires all industrial activities with a proposed construction cost
in excess of $50 million and all energy conversion facilities in excess of
certain capacities to apply for a permit from the Council prior to commence-
ment of construction. It requires the payment of substantial fees used by
the Office of Industrial Siting Administration to review the impacts of the
proposed project. The legislation assigns them responsibility for a wide
ranging assessment of social, economic, land use and public service impacts.
The Council has the power to refuse a permit if it does not find that the
likely impacts of a project are held to an acceptable level or that every
reasonable precaution has been taken to minimize adverse impacts. The
Council may also place conditions on the permits which it does grant.
The Industrial Siting Act does not specifically cover mineral extrac-
tion operations, yet surface mining might be included under the clause
which places any industrial facility with an estimated construction cost of
at least fifty million dollars" under the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Siting Council (ISC). The Office of Industrial Siting Administration be-
lieves the legislative intent is unclear. They had hoped the 1977 session
of the legislature would clarify the matter. However, no amending legis-
lation was enacted.
Distribution of Federal Lease Revenues
Under the Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, the federal government
returned 37 1/2% of all royalties and bonuses on mineral leases on federal
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lands to the state in which those lands were located. The Coal Leasing
Act Amendments of 1975 increased the state share of these royalties to 50%.
Federal law places no restrictions on the use of the funds. The legislative
histories of the Amendments and the BLM Organic Act strongly indicate that
the funds were intended for public facilities and services in communities
experiencing the impacts of energy development on public lands.
From 1923 to 1977, the formula used by the State of Wyoming for the
distribution of federal lease revenues remained basically unchanged. The
formula gave 50% of the revenues to the school foundation program, 35% to
the highway fund for general purposes, 9% to the University of Wyoming, and
6% to roads in the counties containing federal lands. In fiscal year 1972-
1973 the state received $19,855,000 from the leases. By calendar year
1975 this figure reached $34,786,000.
Act 120 of the 1977 legislative session provided for the future dis-
tribution of the mineral lease revenues received from the federal govern-
ment. Bonus payments, which are made by companies when leases are signed,
are separated from royalty payments and reserved to alleviate problems
associated with mineral development. Half of the bonus payments will be
placed in the government royalty impact assistance account for distribution
by the FLB. The other half will be reserved for the legislature to decide
on its use.
Under the new legislation, royalty payments will be distributed as
shown in Table 11 in the text. (p.51.) This distribution preserves exactly
the share allocated previously with the exception of the amount allocated
to the highway fund. In 1983, the additional 6% the fdnd now gains will be
shifted to the royalty assistance account. The FLB is authorized to make
grants from the government royalty assistance account for planning, cons-
truction, and operation of public facilities and services. Priority will
be given to impacted communities. The FLB plans to decide on grant awards
at meetings every six months in which applications will be compared on the
basis of relative need and the ability of a community to fund the project
itself. If an application is rejected, it will remain pending and be re-
considered at subsequent meetings. In July the FLB will amke the first
$2 million in grants, which may not be pledged against future expenditures,
and will grant about $4 million each year under the program.
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